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ASSESSING THE COSTS & BENEFITS OF 
CREDIT CARD REWARDS: A RESPONSE 
TO WHO GAINS AND WHO LOSES 
FROM CREDIT CARD PAYMENTS? 
THEORY AND CALIBRATIONS 
Steven Semeraro* 
 
or two decades, economic and legal academics have 
speculated about the impact of the fees that merchants 
pay for credit card acceptance. Since all customers pay the same 
price, the theory goes, everyone pays for the benefits that go only 
to credit card users. A recent Federal Reserve Bank of Boston 
(FRBB) policy paper written by economists Scott Schuh, Oz Shy, 
and Joanna Stavins entitled Who Gains and Who Loses from 
Credit Card Payments? Theory and Calibrations1 has taken the 
argument a step further, contending that credit card programs 
reduce consumer welfare by transferring money from low-income 
households that purchase goods and services with payment 
                                                          
 * Professor of Law, Thomas Jefferson School of Law.  The author thanks 
the American Bankers Association for its generous support for this paper, and 
economists Scott Thompson and Eric Emch of the Bates, White economic 
consulting firm for their valuable assistance.  During the late 1990s, the author 
was the lead attorney on an investigation of Visa and MasterCard when he 
served as a trial attorney with the United States Department of Justice, 
Antitrust Division.  The views expressed herein are exclusively those of the 
author. 
 1   Scott Schuh, Oz Shy & Joanna Stavins, Who Gains and Who Loses from 
Credit Card Payments? Theory and Calibrations (Federal Reserve Bank of 
Boston, Public Policy Discussion Papers No. 10-03, 2010) [hereinafter FRBB]. 
A revised version of the paper by the same authors expands their wealth 
transfer analysis beyond card rewards. Scott Schuh, Oz Shy & Joanna Stavins, 
Who Gains and Who Loses from Credit Card Payments? Theory and 
Calibrations, at 26 (May 4, 2011) [hereinafter Schuh et al. 2011]. This version, 
which has apparently not been published by the Federal Reserve Bank of 
Boston, is cited throughout to highlight relevant differences with Paper No. 
10-03. 
F 
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mechanisms other than credit cards to high-income households 
that pay with cards. Although recognizing that their analysis does 
not yield “precise policy recommendations that would necessarily 
optimize social welfare,”2 the authors nonetheless offer 
suggestions for improvement.3 Specifically, they suggest that 
regulators “could” increase consumer welfare by (1) eliminating 
card system rules that prohibit merchants from surcharging 
credit card transactions, and (2) directly regulating merchant fees 
and reward rates.4 Both proposals would likely reduce or 
eliminate reward programs. 
This article shows that the FRBB economists’ policy 
recommendations would be more likely to harm consumers than 
to help them. First, the authors’ welfare claims are narrower than 
a casual reader might assume. They do not argue that any reward 
program constitutes a bad deal for a cardholder who takes 
advantage of the program. On the contrary, they show that, 
regardless of a cardholder’s income level, reward cards benefit 
those who use them and collect rewards.5 Like all credit cards, 
they provide spending flexibility, a no-cost float period for those 
who do not run balances, and accounting benefits. In addition, 
reward cards effectively lower the price that card users pay for all 
goods and services purchased with the card through a bonus that 
suits the cardholder’s own market preferences. Any regulatory 
steps that reduce the value of reward card programs would 
unquestionably reduce the welfare of those consumers regularly 
receiving card rewards. 
The FRBB authors do claim that reward programs harm 
those consumers who do not use credit cards because merchants 
increase prices to cover card acceptance costs. The FRBB 
authors’ data demonstrates that high-income households use 
reward credit cards more often than low-income households.6 
This disproportionate use, the authors’ claim, transfers wealth 
from poorer to wealthier consumers. Importantly, however, the 
welfare transfer that they predict occurs, if at all, only because 
low-income households on average choose to use reward credit 
cards for a lower percentage of their purchases than do higher-
income households. 
                                                          
 2   Id. at 35. 
 3   Id. 
 4   Id. 
 5   See infra Part II.A. 
   6  FRBB, supra note 1, at 7. 
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The FRBB authors’ proposals would certainly reduce the 
value of reward card programs and thus the welfare of all reward 
card users. Any consumer welfare gains from implementing those 
proposals, however, would be quite speculative. To support their 
welfare predictions, the FRBB authors claim that one can draw 
meaningful conclusions about consumer welfare effects by 
assuming that: (1) merchants pass on the marginal cost of card 
acceptance through their retail prices to all consumers on a 
dollar-for-dollar basis7; and (2) the only relevant benefit in 
assessing the consumer welfare impact of payment system choice 
is the reward paid to credit card users.8 
The data on which the FRBB authors rely do not confirm 
these assumptions. On the contrary, those assumptions are almost 
certainly wrong. Credit card acceptance benefits merchants, 
banks, and even consumers using other payment mechanisms in 
ways that impact the net prices paid by all customers. Merchants 
would not mark up their retail prices by the full marginal cost of 
credit card acceptance costs over other means of payment if, for 
example, card acceptance (1) increases sales by enabling 
consumers to shop more efficiently – alleviating the need to 
predetermine the amount of cash needed or knowing ones 
checking account balance – enabling a merchant to spread its 
fixed costs over more sales or (2) reduces other costs such as the 
risk of unpaid checks, late payment, default, and collection 
expenses.9 In addition, banks may use reward card system profits 
to innovate and expand products that benefit all consumers, such 
as more effective fraud protection, enhanced security, and 
systems that speed up transactions at the point of sale.10 
Moreover, although consumers who choose not to use 
rewards credit cards by definition do not receive credit card 
rewards, they may still benefit from their payment choice in other 
ways. First, reward card use creates spillover effects – such as 
faster checkout times – benefiting all customers. Second, 
overwhelmingly consumers choose to use non-credit-card 
payment mechanisms for some purchases and reward credit cards 
                                                          
 7   More specifically, the authors assume that credit card use increases 
retail prices by precisely the amount that credit card use exceeds the cost to the 
merchant of alternative means of payment. See infra Part IV.A. The authors’ 
analysis ignores the extent to which merchant’s benefit from card acceptance 
in ways that may lower prices. See infra Part IV.B. 
 8   See infra Part IV.A. 
 9  See infra Part IV.B. 
 10  Id. 
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for others, necessarily benefitting themselves in ways not fully 
accounted for in the FRBB policy paper.11 As a result, the FRBB 
authors’ welfare calculations are at best overstated and 
potentially entirely inaccurate. 
Even if one irrationally ignored the non-reward benefits of 
payment system choices, the FRBB authors’ welfare calculations 
would remain suspect.  Important aspects of their consumer 
welfare calculation – most importantly, the strength of the 
preference consumers have for reward cards or other means of 
payment and the negative consumer welfare effect of transferring 
money from low- to high-income households – rest on 
assumptions that are entirely independent of the data on which 
the authors purport to rely.12 These assumptions are critical to the 
magnitude of the consumer welfare effect that they predict, and 
the uncertainty with respect to these factors undermines the 
reliability of their analysis. 
Regulatory intervention is also suspect because if the 
FRBB authors predicted wealth transfers from credit card 
programs existed, they would be indistinguishable from a myriad 
of other reward programs and retailing strategies that have the 
same impact.13 That these practices are so widespread indicates 
that they are generally accepted as legitimate competitive options 
supporting economic vitality. 
Finally, the FRBB authors’ specific policy proposals – 
encouraging surcharging and regulating fees – could have serious, 
negative unintended consequences.14 The ubiquitous nature of 
rewards programs and other retailing strategies that benefit those 
who spend heavily suggests that these programs have economic 
benefits. Rather than undermining card rewards, any regulatory 
activity in credit card markets should focus on expanding the 
availability of consumer-welfare enhancing reward programs to 
those consumers who currently choose not to use them.15 The 
FRBB authors’ proposals, designed to reduce reward card 
availability, thus point in precisely the wrong direction. 
This article begins by explaining the role of merchant fees 
                                                          
 11   See infra at 64-65 (reference to charts showing that two thirds of 
households have both credit and debit cards; nearly all have checking accounts 
in addition to cards; and they use these payment mechanisms in different 
percentages for different categories of purchases). 
 12   See infra Part V. 
 13   See infra Part VI. 
 14   See infra Part VII. 
 15   See infra Part VIII. 
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in credit card systems. Part II summarizes the history of the 
literature recognizing that credit card programs may theoretically 
transfer wealth from low-income to high-income households. 
This part also examines the FRBB policy paper in this context. 
Part III demonstrates that the FRBB economists’ conclusions are 
suspect because the assumptions underlying their analysis 
underestimate the benefits of current payment system choices 
accruing to merchants, card issuing banks, and non-credit card 
users. In Part IV, this paper shows that even if an individual 
irrationally ignored non-reward benefits, the author’s consumer 
welfare predictions would depend on assumptions that are 
independent of the hard data and are thus essentially arbitrary. 
Part V shows that similar wealth transfer effects are pervasive 
throughout the economy. Part VI explains why permitting 
merchants to surcharge card transactions or regulating merchant 
fees would be unwise responses to any wealth transfer that may 
exist. And finally, this article offers alternative steps that could 
combat the potentially negative effects of transferring wealth 
without the risks associated with permitting card transaction 
surcharges or regulating acceptance fees. 
I.  PRICING IN CREDIT CARD MARKETS 
This section explains how the stream of payments flows in 
a credit card transaction and how banks participating in the card 
system earn revenue. The process begins with a cardholder 
purchasing a good or service using the card, thus generating a 
receipt for payment. The card-purchase receipt flows from the 
merchant to its card acceptance bank (CAB) and then to the 
bank, such as Citibank, that issued the Visa, MasterCard, 
American Express, or Discover card (issuer). For example, when 
a customer makes a $100 purchase with a credit card, the 
merchant’s CAB would pay the retailer approximately $98. The 
difference is the merchant’s fee ($2 in this case) for card 
acceptance. This fee is commonly called the merchant discount 
because it amounts to a discount from the full purchase price that 
compensates the credit card system.16 
Next, the issuer would typically pay the CAB 
                                                          
 16   In many cases, the merchant fee would include a small fixed amount 
per transaction as well as a percentage of the total. The fixed fee is ignored in 
the illustration in the text to demonstrate more clearly the flow of funds. 
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approximately $98.50 for the receivable17 and bill the cardholder 
for the entire $100, plus interest if the account has a balance. 
From the $2.00 fee paid by the merchant, the CAB would 
typically keep about $.50 or 25%. The remaining $1.50, 
approximately 75% of the revenue from the merchant, constitutes 
the fee that a merchant effectively pays to the issuer.18 This fee is 
often referred to as the interchange fee.19 Both the level of the 
merchant discount and the percentages of the purchase price 
retained by the issuer and the CAB will vary depending on the 
industry, type of card, and a variety of other factors. In all cases, 
however, the issuer will receive a substantially larger percentage 
of the merchant fee than the CAB.20 
Although merchant fees are an important source of card-
issuer revenue, approximately 70% of a typical card issuer’s 
revenue comes from interest paid by cardholders for financed 
purchases.21 In addition, a recent survey by Phoenix Marketing 
International shows that some credit cards, and particularly 
reward cards, also carry an annual fee paid by the cardholder.22 
Issuers also charge cardholders a variety of other fees for services 
provided as well as for violations of the cardholder agreement, 
such as late payments, that raise the cost of the system for all 
participants. 
                                                          
 17   In practice, a small percentage of the merchant fee compensates the 
card network rather than either the CAB or the issuer for the network’s costs 
of processing transactions. 
 18   Alan S. Frankel, Monopoly and Competition in the Supply and 
Exchange of Money, 66 ANTITRUST L. J. 313, 340 (1998). 
 19   The term interchange was used in the Visa and MasterCard systems 
because it constituted the fee that a bank acquiring card transactions from a 
merchant paid to the bank that had issued the card. Unitary systems such as 
American Express, Diners Club, and Discover did not technically have 
interchange fees. Nevertheless, they have always charged more to merchants 
than the cost of providing merchant services. As a result, merchant fees were 
used by these systems to support the card issuing business, just as they were in 
the Visa and MasterCard systems. Steven Semeraro, Credit Card Interchange 
Fees: Three Decades of Antitrust Uncertainty, 14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 941, 
947 (2007). 
 20   Id. 
 21   DAVID S. EVANS & RICHARD SCHMALENSEE, PAYING WITH PLASTIC: 
THE DIGITAL REVOLUTION IN BUYING AND BORROWING 223 (2d ed. 2005). 
 22   Appendix I.F. This article relies on data produced by Phoenix 
Marketing International through a broad survey of consumers about credit 
card and other payment methods. This survey data is cited throughout this 
article and is on file with the Consumer Law Review. 
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II. THE LIMITED SCOPE OF THE FRBB AUTHORS’ 
CONSUMER WELFARE ANALYSIS 
The FRBB authors do not contend that (1) card use 
reduces the welfare of any consumer who receives card rewards; 
or (2) the banks’ business model sacrifices profit from high-
income card users in order to increase revenues earned from low-
income households. 
A. Reward Card Holders Benefit From the Current Credit Card 
System 
The FRBB authors’ data shows that reward credit cards 
are generally available to consumers in both low- and high-
income groups, those who use reward credit cards to collect air 
travel, discounts, or cash, experience substantial welfare gains.23  
The FRBB policy paper thus confirms that reward cards are a 
good deal for those who use them to collect rewards, regardless of 
the cardholder’s income level.24 As the authors conclude, even 
“low-income credit card buyers” benefit from those cards, 
receiving “a subsidy ($613)” annually as a result of their reward 
card use.25 
B. High-Income Card Users Generate Substantial Bank Profits 
The FRBB policy paper focuses entirely on the fees that 
merchants pay for card acceptance. The authors’ primary model 
takes no account of the impact of revolving credit, annual fees, or 
other fee revenue earned by banks issuing credit cards.26 Yet, this 
                                                          
 23   FRBB, supra note 1, at 38 (Table 11) (showing that reducing card 
rewards alone would reduce consumer welfare). 
 24   Id. at 20-21 (Table 6). 
 25   Id. at 21. 
 26   In a draft revision of their paper, the authors purport to take account of 
revolving debt. Schuh et al. 2011, supra note 3, at 9-10, 15-16, 19-24. Although 
they recognize that high-income households revolve more often and pay more 
interest (albeit at a slightly lower interest rate), the authors conclude that on 
average taking account of revolving debt increases the transfer somewhat. Id. 
at 9. Their revised analysis, however, is driven by the their assumptions about 
the distribution of profits through stock ownership. Id. at 27 (calculating that 
nearly two-thirds of the transfer between low- and high-income households 
persists even when the two groups are assumed to shop at entirely different 
merchants because of the authors assumptions about “interest payments, float, 
and redistributed profits”). Id. Transfer effects resulting from interest 
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revenue exceeds merchant fee revenue collected by card-issuing 
banks, and low-income households do not pay more than their 
proportional share of it. Over the past decade, Phoenix Marketing 
International surveyed over 21,000 households about their 
payment system choices.27 The data generated by this survey 
confirmed that reward card accounts contribute more to total 
market performance than non-rewards accounts, particularly at 
high-income levels from all three sources (financing, cardholder 
fees, and merchant fees).28 A rarely used account, by contrast, is 
unprofitable. High-use cardholders, a disproportionate 
percentage of which are high-income cardholders, thus subsidize 
low-income cardholders who use their credit cards only rarely.29 
The FRBB authors do not dispute this conclusion, recognizing 
that (1) “the propensity to revolve credit card spending is 
surprisingly similar across income groups”;30 (2) “high-income 
households carry about twice as much revolving debt as low-
income households”; and (3) high-income households pay on 
average almost twice as much interest.31 High-income households 
also generate more annual fee revenue than low-income 
households.32 The FRBB authors do not dispute this, recognizing 
that all cardholder income groups pay more than enough out of 
their own pockets “to cover the credit card rewards earned by the 
group.”33 
                                                          
payments occur because they are assumed to fund the float period enjoyed by 
convenience users, a transfer that impacts high-income households as often as 
low-income households, (See Table 3), and is purely a matter of household 
choice.  Id. at 9, 22-23.  The assumptions about redistribution of bank profits 
are criticized. See infra at IV.C. 
 27   Appendix at I.A. (providing background on data produced by the 
Phoenix Marketing International survey of consumers about their payment 
system choices). This survey data is cited throughout this article and is on file 
with the Consumer Law Review. 
   28  Id. 
 29   Id. 
 30   FRBB, supra note 1, at 4. Reward credit cards often have a slightly 
higher interchange fee than non-reward cards, but this increment amounts to 
only about 25% of a typical reward payment and accounts for an even lower 
percentage of the more generous reward programs. 
 31   Id. at 42 (low income households average $788 in interest per year while 
high income households average $1,316). 
 32   Id. at 43 (low-income households pay an average of $5.7 while high-
income households pay $7.7). The FRBB authors nevertheless conclude that 
interest income is unlikely to play “a major role in the [wealth] transfers.”  Id. 
at 4, 42. 
 33   Id. at 42. 
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This data and analysis shows that the FRBB authors’ 
predicted wealth transfer from low- to high-income households 
cannot be attributed to any inherent flaw in the card systems. 
They do not point to any data suggesting that reward cards are 
unavailable to low-income households, and the authors make 
clear that they have no reason to believe that banks have 
designed card systems to transfer wealth.34 The most recent 
Phoenix Marketing data confirms the wide availability of reward 
cards, showing that they outpace non-reward card ownership 
across income groups. 
As a result, if high-income households receive 
disproportionate benefits, they do so in part because individual 
members of those households choose to use credit cards to make a 
higher percentage of their purchases than members of low-income 
households. Any wealth transfer that may occur is thus 
attributable to individual consumer choices about payment 
mechanisms. 
III.  THE HISTORY OF CREDIT CARD WEALTH 
TRANSFER ANALYSIS 
The basic economic intuition underlying the FRBB 
authors’ wealth transfer calculations is not new. Since the early-
1980s, commentators have explained that credit card use might 
transfer wealth from non-card customers to card users because 
merchants pay for card transactions by blending their card 
acceptance fees with their other costs of doing business.35 All 
customers thus pay the same retail price at the point of sale 
regardless of the means of payment used.  So, if (a) a purchase 
made with a credit card costs merchants more than a purchase 
made with another means of payment and (b) merchants increase 
their retail prices on a dollar-for-dollar basis to recover the entire 
difference in cost between card acceptance and other means of 
payment, then (c) non-credit card customers would subsidize card 
users. 
To the extent that high-income households use cards more 
frequently than low-income households, this transfer could cross 
income groups. Importantly, no commentator prior to the FRBB 
authors has claimed that the theoretical possibility of a wealth 
                                                          
 34   Id. at 4-5; see infra note 126 (citing sources confirming the wide 
availability of reward credit cards). 
 35  See infra Part III.A. 
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transfer can be confirmed and be used to calculate the overall 
effect of credit card use on consumer welfare. 
This section reviews the existing commentary, placing the 
FRBB policy paper in the context of a long-history of theorizing 
about the potential wealth transfer effects of credit card use. It 
first focuses on commentary recognizing the theoretical possibility 
of a transfer, and it then summarizes the claims made by the 
FRBB authors and the author of another recent paper claiming 
to demonstrate empirically that a transfer in fact occurs. 
A. The Theory that Credit Card Use Transfers Wealth 
In 1983, a Federal Reserve Board of Governors’ staff 
report explained that a statute permitting cash discounts was at 
least in part justified by a potential wealth transfer from non-
credit-card to credit card users. The report noted that “[t]he 
fundamental thesis underlying the Cash Discount Act is that 
credit card transactions are more costly to retailers than cash or 
check transactions, and that the higher costs of credit cards are 
incorporated in the price of goods and services paid by all 
customers, resulting in a subsidy of credit buyers by cash 
purchasers.”36 
A dozen years later, economists Dennis Carlton and Alan 
Frankel expanded on this possibility. Interchange fees, they 
explained, “can be viewed as a way to raise costs to merchants 
who then pass those costs on to cash and credit customers alike 
by charging the same higher price to both.”37 Like the Federal 
Reserve authors’ staff, these economists recognized that 
merchants generally charge the same price to all customers 
regardless of the means of payment,38 and both cash and credit 
consumers therefore contribute to the merchant’s costs of 
                                                          
 36   John M. Barron, Michael E. Staten & John Umbeck, Discounts for 
Cash in Retail Gasoline Marketing 16 (Credit Research Center, Krannert 
Graduate School of Management, Purdue University, Working Paper 57, 
Sept.1991) (quoting Credit Cards in the U.S. Economy: Their Impact on Costs, 
Prices, and Retail Sales, Washington: Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System, 1996) available at 
http://faculty.msb.edu/prog/CRC/pdf/wp57.pdf. 
 37   Dennis W. Carlton & Alan S. Frankel, The Antitrust Economics of 
Credit Card Networks, 63 ANTITRUST L. J. 643, 656-58 (1994-95). 
 38   Alan S. Frankel & Allan L. Shampine, The Economic Effects of 
Interchange Fees, 73 ANTITRUST L. J. 627, 632 (2006) (“Price coherence creates 
cross-subsidies between payment methods with different costs.”); Frankel, 
supra note 18, at 314-39. 
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accepting various means of payment.39 
In 2001, economist Michael Katz concluded that, all else 
being equal, “[w]hen card-based transactions are more costly to 
merchants than are non-card-based transactions, non-card users 
are hurt by card use because merchants have incentives to raise 
retail prices to reflect their higher costs due to some consumers’ 
using relatively expensive payment means.”40 Katz identified the 
potential problem as an economic distortion, rather than a wealth 
transfer. The potentially higher prices that might occur as a result 
of increased card use, Katz argued, would inefficiently distort 
consumption by increasing the relative attractiveness of goods 
sold in markets with little or no card use.41 
In 2002-03, two economic papers presented formal models 
recognizing that credit card use could potentially produce cross 
subsidies between types of consumers. Marius Schwartz and 
Daniel Vincent examined the interacting effects of the card 
systems’ no-surcharge rules and reward programs.42 They found 
that cash customers are harmed because they fund resources that 
are used to compensate card users, although they concluded that 
the net social welfare effect of surcharging is ambiguous.43 
Shortly thereafter, Sujit Chakravorti and William Emmons 
concluded that surcharging could reduce the negative effects of a 
cross-subsidy from those who borrow on credit cards to those 
                                                          
 39   Michael L. Katz, Commissioned Report, 2 REFORM OF CREDIT CARD 
SCHEMES IN AUSTRALIA 41 (Reserve Bank of Australia Aug. 2001) available at 
http://www.rba.gov.au/PaymentsSystem/Reforms/CCSchemes/consult_doc_ot
her_pub.html (“When card-based transactions are more costly to merchants 
than are non-card-based transactions, non-card users are hurt by card use 
because merchants have incentives to raise retail prices to reflect their higher 
costs due to some consumers’ using relatively expensive payment means.”); 
Jean-Charles Rochet & Jean Tirole, Externalities and Regulation in Card 
Payment Systems, 5 REV. NETWORK CON. 1, 4 (2006) (“Merchants are likely to 
pass the extra costs, if any, of card transactions through to consumers in 
general, that is to cardholders and cash payers altogether”). This subsidization 
of card use by merchants may be efficient just as the subsidization of 
newspaper production and delivery costs by newspaper advertisers is efficient. 
For a discussion of the economics, see Steven Semeraro, The Antitrust 
Economics (and Law) of Surcharging Credit Card Transactions, 14 STAN. J. L. 
BUS. & FIN. 343, 353-65 (2009). 
 40   Katz, supra note 39, at 41. 
 41   Id. at 39. 
 42   Marius Schwartz & Daniel R. Vincent, Same Price, Cash or Card: 
Vertical Control by Payment Networks 6, 23 (Dep’t. of Econ., Georgetown U., 
Working Paper 02-01, 2002). 
 43   Id. 
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who use the cards merely to transact and collect rewards.44 
In 2005, Carlton and Frankel published another paper, 
this time suggesting that a potential wealth transfer could flow 
not just from card users to non-card users, but from low- to high-
income households.45 “[L]ow income and minority households,” 
they observed, “are far more likely to use cash exclusively than 
are more affluent households.”46 
In 2006, Alan Frankel, this time with economist Allan 
Shampine, argued that card acceptance fees “significantly and 
arbitrarily raise[] prices,” and distort competition by “steering 
consumers toward using more costly and less efficient payment 
methods.”47  Their analysis shows a connection between 
increasing interchange fees and increasing card purchase volume, 
because card issuers use the revenue from interchange fees to 
lower prices for card users and to increase rewards.48 “Although it 
is true that an interchange fee will stimulate card usage,” they 
claimed, “it accomplishes this not merely by shifting costs of card 
usage to merchants, but to non-card customers.”49 
None of this commentary took account of the benefits that 
increasing card use provides to merchants. Instead, the authors 
reasoned that all else being equal, as card acceptance fees 
increase, merchants will tend to raise prices as they would if any 
other cost of doing business increased.50 Most of the authors 
simply ignored the possibility that all would not be equal if credit 
card use benefitted merchants, banks, and non-card-using 
customers.51 Taking these benefits into account could yield net 
                                                          
 44   Sujit Chakravorti & William R. Emmons, Who Pays for Credit Cards?, 
37 J. OF CONSUMER AFF. 208, 226-27 (2003). 
 45   Dennis Carleton & Alan Frankel, Transaction Costs, Externalities, and 
“Two-Sided” Payment Markets, 2005 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 617, 637, 640-41 
(“only 28.5% of families with annual income below $10,000 possess a bank 
credit card, compared to 95.8% of families with incomes above $100,000, and 
only ‘59% of African-American households had credit cards in 2001, compared 
to 53% for Latinos and 82% for whites’”) (quoting Study Shows Card Use 
Linked to Race, CARDLINE, http://www.cardline.com (May 24, 2005) (citing a 
study based on data from the Federal Reserve’s Survey of Consumer Finances 
for the years 1992 through 2001). 
 46   Id. 
 47   Frankel & Shampine, supra note 38, at 671-72. 
 48   Id. at 634-37 (“cardholders pay higher retail prices as interchange fees 
increase”). 
 49   Id. at 658-59. 
 50   Id. at 636; Chakravorti & Emmons, supra note 44, at 210; Schwartz & 
Vincent, supra note 42, at 16. 
 51   Schwartz and Vincent are the exception, recognizing explicitly that they 
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consumer welfare increases, even for non-card-using consumers, 
compared to a world without credit cards. 
B.  Claiming to Empirically Confirm a Consumer -Welfare 
Decreasing Transfer 
Prior to the FRBB policy paper, no commentator claimed 
to quantify the magnitude of a consumer welfare decrease as a 
result of the theoretical possibility of a wealth transfer from low-
income to high-income households. One non-economist author, 
Adam Levitin, did claim to empirically confirm a wealth transfer 
from non-card users to credit card purchasers.52 This section 
identifies the weaknesses in Levitin’s more limited wealth 
transfer claim, and it then reviews the FRBB authors’ uniquely 
expansive social welfare claims. 
1.  Credit Card Fees and Gasoline Retailer Cash Discounts 
Levitin based his analysis on data showing that when, in 
the late 1980s, gasoline retailers regularly charged separate cash 
and credit prices, they always charged card users more than cash 
customers. From this, he concluded that card acceptance 
increased costs for all customers and thus shifted wealth toward 
credit card users.53 Importantly, Levitin’s claim is distinguishable 
from those made in the FRBB policy paper, because Levitin did 
not draw explicit conclusions about changes in overall consumer 
welfare as a result of the wealth transfer that he purported to 
confirm. 
In addition, Levitin’s analysis was criticized because he 
ignored the likelihood that the market forces driving the gas 
stations’ differing prices for cash and credit transactions were 
attributable to factors having little to do with credit card 
acceptance fees.54 Since the late 1980s, both credit markets and 
                                                          
“restrict[ed their] attention to . . . where the merchant derives no gross benefit 
from processing card rather than cash transactions . . .”  Schwartz & Vincent, 
supra note 42, at 16. 
 52   Adam Levitin, Priceless? The Social Costs of Credit Card Merchant 
Restraints, 45 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1 (2008). 
 53   Although Levitin’s empirical analysis did not directly address a wealth 
transfer between income groups, he nonetheless urged Congress to take steps 
similar to those proposed by the FRBB authors, including rules prohibiting 
merchants from surcharging card transactions. Id. at 15-16. 
 54   Steven Semeraro, The Reverse-Robin-Hood-Cross-Subsidy Hypothesis: 
Do Credit Card Systems Tax the Poor and Reward the Rich?, 40 RUTGERS L. 
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the benefits of card acceptance have changed dramatically. Most 
critically, gasoline retailers now overwhelmingly charge the same 
price for cash and credit purchases, and some effectively discount 
credit purchases through the use of reward cards.55 As a result, 
the price differences observed in Levitin’s data are not 
generalizable across time and industries, and thus cannot 
conclusively demonstrate a transfer from non-card users to card 
purchasers, much less from low-income to high-income 
households.56 
2.  The FRBB Policy Paper’s Unique Consumer Welfare Claims 
The FRBB policy paper’s authors acknowledge that the 
theory that credit card use may transfer wealth is not new. But 
they claim to be “the first to compute who gains and loses from 
credit card payments in the aggregate economy” on a dollar-for-
dollar basis.57 In summarizing their findings, the FRBB authors 
claim that a consumer’s “decision to pay by credit card 
involves . . . retail price increases, a nontrivial transfer of income 
from cash to card payers, and consequently a transfer from low-
income to high-income consumers.”58 
This process occurs, the FRBB authors contend, because 
“merchants mark up their retail prices for all consumers by 
enough to recoup the merchant fees from credit card sales”59 and 
“merchant fees are passed on [] to all buyers in the form of higher 
retail prices.”60  Card rewards come into play because card issuers 
are assumed to use merchant fees in part to pay rewards to card 
users. Non-card users thus pay higher prices that help fund the 
                                                          
J. REV. 419, 437-43 (2009). 
 55   Appendix II.K. This article relies on data produced by Phoenix 
Marketing International through a broad survey of consumers about credit 
card and other payment methods. This survey data is cited throughout this 
article and is on file with the Consumer Law Review. See Shell Platinum 
Mastercard, SHELL,  
http://www.shell.us/home/content/usa/products_services/shell_cards/mastercar
d/ (last visited Oct. 25, 2012) (describing Exxon the Shell MasterCard paying a 
15 cent with which cardholders can save $.10-.20 per gallon rebate plus 2% of 
other purchases up compared to $10,000 and 1% on additional eligible 
purchases paying with cash). 
 56  Semeraro, supra note 54, at 437-43. 
 57   Schuh et al. 2011, supra note 1, at 2. 
 58   Id. at 1. 
 59   Id. 
 60   Id. at 2. 
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rewards, but they receive no rewards themselves. Reward card 
use thus transfers wealth, the authors reason, to those who use 
those cards.61 
Next, the FRBB authors observe that card use is not 
consistent across income types. Higher income groups use credit 
cards more and receive greater rewards than low-income groups. 
“Consequently,” the authors reason, “the subsidy of credit card 
payers by cash payers also involves a regressive transfer of 
income from low-income to high-income consumers.”62 The 
authors calculate that on average each household with an annual 
income below $50,000 contributes from $21-$26 to subsidize 
wealthier households.  The loss becomes a small gain for 
households with incomes exceeding $50,000 annually and grows 
to the point that the average household earning above $150,000 
per year receives a $750 annual subsidy.63 The authors then 
calculate that eliminating merchant fees and card rewards would 
increase consumer welfare by 0.15-0.26 percent; a result that they 
believe justifies regulatory intervention.64 
The authors acknowledge that households, merchants, 
and banks all could take steps to preempt these predicted welfare 
transfers and that “the limitations of [their] model and analysis 
[does not permit them to] provide precise policy recommendations 
that would necessarily optimize social welfare.”65 Nevertheless, 
                                                          
 61   See generally id. at 28 (showing assumed values for the cost of 
accepting cash, credit cards, and of reward payments to card users). 
 62   Id. at 2. 
 63   Id. at 22. In a draft revision of the paper, the authors purport to 
consider the financing component of credit cards in addition to merchant fees 
and rewards. In this version, the positive impact of cards does not kick in until 
household income exceeds $120,000 annually and the authors calculate that 
households making under $100,000 on average contribute $81 and households 
making over $100,000 gain $350. Schuh et al. 2011, supra note 1, at 26; id. at 3 
(breaking the calculation out as, on average, a $63 loss for households earning 
less than $20,000 per year and a $840 gain for households earning more than 
$150,000 annually). 
 64   Schuh et al. 2011, supra note 1, at 3-4, 21. The authors consider 
alterations to their model (e.g., price differentiation and imperfect competition) 
that would reduce, but not eliminate, the transfer payment that they calculate. 
Id. at 38-40.  They then conjecture that business card use, which they do not 
consider, would increase the transfer because business cards are more likely to 
be used by high-income households. Id. at 43. But business cards are also 
likely to be used overwhelmingly to make purchases that low-income 
cardholders are relatively less likely to make: air travel, taxis, expensive hotels, 
and fine dining establishments. 
 65   Id. at 35. 
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they recommend, inter alia, that regulatory authorities consider 
the following initiatives: eliminate impediments to merchants 
surcharging card transactions; and directly regulate merchant 
fees with the caveat that the optimal fee is difficult to determine 
and thus regulators “could actually reduce consumer welfare.”66 
The following section demonstrates that the FRBB 
authors’ wealth transfer calculations are suspect because of their 
failure to consider fully the benefits of various payment system 
choices to merchants, banks, and non-credit-card users. These 
benefits impact the magnitude of any wealth transfer and 
potentially its direction as well. Subsequent parts show that even 
if non-reward benefits are ignored, (1) the authors’ welfare 
calculations rest on essentially arbitrary assumptions that are not 
dictated by their data, and (2) any wealth transfer that may occur 
would not justify the sort of regulatory responses that the FRBB 
authors propose. 
IV.  TAKING ACCOUNT OF THE FULL BENEFITS OF 
PAYMENT SYSTEM CHOICES 
The FRBB policy paper claims to calculate the amount by 
which credit card use reduces consumer welfare. In making their 
predictions, the authors purport to rely on a comprehensive data 
set.67  But these hard data do not dictate their welfare 
calculations. To generate those results, the authors implausibly 
assume that the only benefits from payment system choice that 
matter to consumer welfare are the rewards paid to credit card 
users. This Part explains the authors’ assumption and then 
discusses how the array of benefits flowing from card use to 
merchants, banks, and even non-credit-card using consumers 
impacts consumer welfare. 
A. The FRBB Authors’ Implicitly Assume that Credit Card 
Rewards are the Only Benefit of Payment System Choice 
The authors’ consumer welfare prediction flows from the 
following line of reasoning: a merchant’s net – as opposed to out-
of-pocket – cost of accepting credit cards is equal to the difference 
                                                          
 66   Id. at 35-36. 
 67   Id. at 5 (finding that over the past 20 years, the percentage of total 
consumption paid for by credit cards has increased by two thirds); id. at 7-9, 16 
(wealthy consumers on average use credit cards more than low-income 
households but wide variance exists within all wealth levels). 
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between the price that a bank charges the merchant for card 
acceptance services and the merchant’s blended out-of-pocket 
costs for handling alternative means of payment (i.e., the 
merchant receives no cost reducing benefits from card 
acceptance); a merchant passes “through the full merchant [credit 
card acceptance] fee to . . . customers via the retail price,”68 
making the merchant’s single price to all customers higher than it 
otherwise would be in the absence of credit card use by precisely 
the amount that the merchant’s card acceptance fees exceed what 
the merchant would have paid if its customers had used 
alternative means of payment;69 card fees are in fact higher than 
the cost of other means of payment and thus card use increases 
retail prices and reduces the welfare of all consumers; and credit 
card rewards increase the welfare of card-using consumers more 
than the higher retail prices reduced their welfare, but non-card 
using consumers are worse off because they receive no rewards 
and, implicitly, no other benefit flowing from payment system 
choice is relevant to consumer welfare. 
To be sure, the FRBB policy paper acknowledges that the 
“validity [of its assumptions] is an empirical matter and the data 
needed to verify them are not available.”70 But the problem goes 
well beyond a lack of precision in the available information to the 
basic question of how to assess consumer welfare. The authors 
tacitly and inexplicably deem benefits flowing from card use 
(other than rewards) irrelevant. They never acknowledge this 
assumption. Like most of the theoretical papers summarized in 
Part III, they fail to incorporate into their calculations other 
benefits from payment system choices that flow to merchants, 
banks, and non-credit-card-using consumers. Unlike the 
theoretical papers, however, the FRBB authors claim to draw 
firm, real world conclusions from their analysis. 
The following sections show that (1) the non-reward 
benefits of card use and (2) the benefits that consumers receive 
from choosing different payment mechanisms for different 
purposes could both significantly impact the magnitude and even 
the direction of any wealth transfer and thus the consumer 
welfare implications of card rewards. 
                                                          
 68   Id. at 16. 
 69   Id. at 17. 
 70   Id. at 16. 
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B. The Benefits of Credit Card Use to Merchants 
The FRBB authors’ analysis considers the merchants’ 
out-of-pocket cost of accepting credit cards, but it fails to consider 
the benefits accruing to the merchant as a result of card 
acceptance or the costs that would likely accrue if credit cards 
were not available. If the authors believe that merchants receive 
no direct benefits or cost savings, they fail to explain that wholly 
unjustified conclusion. Merchants are not required to accept 
credit cards. Some do not, and many do not accept all brands of 
cards. Merchants must therefore perceive some benefit to 
accepting the cards that they choose to accept. 
To determine the impact of card acceptance on retail 
prices and consumer welfare, a merchant’s benefits, including 
ancillary cost savings resulting from card acceptance, must be 
weighed against its costs to determine the merchant’s net loss or 
gain. The FRBB authors effectively assume that, without credit 
cards, the merchant would have exactly the same costs (except for 
the absence of credit card acceptance fees) and make just as many 
sales in precisely the same quantities and with the same 
likelihood of actually receiving timely payment. The authors’ 
analysis thus amounts to a worst-case scenario that would apply 
only if – for some mysterious reason – merchants accepted credit 
cards even though they received no benefit from doing so. 
No hard data supports this unrealistic assumption, and 
strong intuitions as well as available data weigh against it. As an 
initial matter, credit cards provide the merchant with a 
guaranteed source of timely payment. Particularly for larger 
purchases, the likely alternative – a check – carries considerable 
risk.71 According to the 2010 Federal Reserve Payments Study, 
126.8 million checks totaling $126.9 billion were returned 
unpaid.72 Although not all bad checks were written to merchants 
that could have alternatively accepted credit card payments, a 
                                                          
 71   Although the percentage of non-cash payments made by check has 
fallen in recent years, they are still used for approximately twenty percent of 
all payments and probably a much higher percentage of large payments in 
excess of a few hundred dollars. FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, THE 2010 
FEDERAL RESERVE PAYMENTS STUDY: NONCASH PAYMENT TRENDS IN THE 
UNITED STATES: 2006 – 2009 11 (Apr. 5, 2011) (showing that in 2009 out of 
$109 billion non-cash payments 24.5 billion were paid by check compared to 
21.6 billion by credit card); id. at 13 (showing average check to be $1165); id. at 
54 (showing average value of a credit card transaction to be $86). 
 72   Id. at 23. 
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substantial portion surely were. Over 70% of check payments by 
number and over 80% by value were made by consumers or 
businesses to businesses and thus potentially could have 
substituted for a credit card transaction.73 And subscribing to 
systems to protect against bad checks would (1) increase the 
merchant’s out of pocket costs just as credit card acceptance 
does, but (2) not provide the additional benefits credit cards 
provide. These benefits are discussed in Part IV infra, and 
include increased sales, reduced payment delays or defaults, 
reduced merchant collection costs, improved transaction flow, 
and assistance with accounting.74 
Accepting credit cards may thus lead a merchant to 
decrease its retail prices if the relative net costs of non-credit-card 
payment mechanisms that the merchant accepts exceed the net 
cost of credit cards.75 To determine the net cost, one must 
subtract from the out-of-pocket expenses of accepting a payment 
mechanism – on which the FRBB authors rely – the incremental 
benefits and avoided ancillary costs that the merchant derives 
from customers choosing that form of payment compared to the 
alternatives.76 Assuming that retail markets are competitive, these 
benefits should translate into consumer benefits through lower 
retail prices or quality enhancements, such as faster transactions. 
When these merchant benefits are combined with those accruing 
to non-credit card consumers as a result of their payment choice 
(see infra IV.D.), the FRBB authors’ welfare conclusions are 
                                                          
 73   Id. at 32 (showing that 71.4 percent of checks are written to businesses 
from consumers or other businesses); id. at 35 (showing that 79.5 percent of 
check value comes from checks written to businesses by consumers or other 
businesses). 
 74   See Margaret E. Guerin-Calvert & Jansuz A. Ordover, Merchant 
Benefits and Public Policy toward Interchange: An Economic Assessment, 18-
19 (2005) available at 
http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/conference/2005/antitrust/Guerin_Calver
t_Ordover.pdf (reviewing the empirical evidence and concluding that “the 
costs of providing [check verification] services are roughly comparable – if not 
somewhat higher – than those for credit card ‘payment guarantee’ services”). 
 75   In a draft revision of their paper, the FRBB authors recognize that 
something other than a 100 percent pass through is possible, but they continue 
to assume it as their benchmark. Schuh et al. 2011, supra note 1, at 19. 
 76   Julian Wright, The Determinants of Optimal Interchange Fees in 
Payment Systems, LII J. OF INDUS. ECON. 1, 18, 20 (2004)  (“one cannot 
presume . . . that cash-paying customers necessarily pay more as a result of the 
existence of more expensive card-paying customers – one has to consider the 
additional benefits the cards provide as well”). 
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significantly undermined. 
The following subsections analyze the relative costs and 
benefits to merchants of accepting various means of payment, 
concluding that disparities producing significant wealth transfers 
are unlikely and, if they exist, they are likely to be small and non-
credit card users are likely to be better off when the merchants 
with whom they deal accept credit cards. Subsequent sections 
will then explain how benefits accruing to banks and non-
cardholding consumers also positively impact consumer welfare 
in ways not taken into account by the FRBB authors. 
1.  The Costs of Accepting Payment Mechanisms 
Determining the cost of accepting a means of payment is 
more complicated than asking how much a merchant must pay to 
a service provider. Any form of payment will create expenses for 
the merchant. For example, one tends to think that accepting 
cash is free. In fact, cash-accepting merchants bear significant 
costs that would not be borne by a merchant, such as an internet-
only retailer, that only accepted cards.  These costs range from 
the time it takes to make change to the costs of counting the cash 
and making deposits, to theft losses and the cost of insuring 
against them.77 For example, a Food Marketing Research study 
calculated that the cost of cash acceptance was 1.9% of a $100 
transaction without taking account of uncompensated theft losses 
or incremental insurance costs as a result of cash acceptance.78 
Under a unitary retail pricing policy, a non-cash purchaser must 
help cover these expenses, just as a cash-paying customer 
contributes to the merchant’s cost of accepting credit cards. 
 To determine the direction of any subsidy, one must look to 
the relative net costs of various means of payment. The FRBB 
                                                          
 77   Timothy J. Muris, Payment Card Regulation and the (Mis)application 
of Economics of Two-sided Markets, 2005 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 515, 538 
(2005) (explaining that “[c]ash, for instance, imposes costs on retailers and 
consumers that electronic payment systems do not. One example is the labor 
cost associated with counting cash and reconciling the cash register drawer. As 
labor costs increase, the cost of cash payments to retailers becomes more 
expensive relative to electronic payments. In addition, cash has a higher risk of 
theft and loss for both consumers and merchants (from employee malfeasance). 
The costs associated with collecting and transporting cash safely, most notably 
armored cars, do not exist for payment cards”). 
 78   FRONTIER ECONOMICS, JOINT BANK REVIEW OF CREDIT CARD 
MEMBERSHIP AND INTERCHANGE FEES: REPORT ON CREDIT CARD 
INTERCHANGE FEES TO REVIEW BANKS 22 (2001). 
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authors assume a 1.5% difference between credit cards, on the 
one hand, and a blended rate for all other means of payment, on 
the other.79 Although they purport to rely on sophisticated cost 
studies,80 the variation in these studies reveals that there is no 
accepted method of calculating the relative costs of payment 
mechanisms. Moreover, at average transaction volumes, these 
studies generally calculate the cost difference between credit 
cards and other means of payment at less than 1% of the retail 
price.81 
Even this low percentage is likely to be overstated – and 
may point in the wrong direction entirely – given the potential for 
ancillary cost savings flowing from card acceptance. As the 
economists Guerin-Calvert and Ordover have explained, 
“academic papers assessing interchange fees and the efficiency 
and welfare effects of various outcomes are necessarily based on 
stripped down models that do not capture the richness of the 
markets at issue.”82 As a result, they have tended to 
underestimate the ancillary cost savings that merchants enjoy 
because they accept credit cards.83 
The principal ancillary cost savings from credit card 
acceptance encompass payment verification and credit extension.  
Were merchants to forego card acceptance, most would continue 
to desire means to continue verifying payments and extending 
credit. Some larger merchants may be able to perform these 
functions for themselves, though many could not. And while 
third-party providers exist, the size and ubiquity of credit card 
                                                          
 79   FRBB, supra note 1, at 13. Even using the authors’ own number, the 
impact of card rewards is far less significant than the fee difference.  Although 
the authors favor eliminating all card rewards, id. at 34, their analysis predicts 
that doing so would ameliorate only 1.4% of the markup consumers 
purportedly pay as a result of credit card use. Id. at 29, 32, 36-37 (merchant fee 
more influential than rewards).  Of course, eliminating card rewards would 
entirely eliminate the consumer welfare gains now enjoyed by those using 
these cards. 
 80   David Humphrey et al., What Does It Cost to Make a Payment?, 2 REV. 
OF NETWORK ECON. 159, 162-63 (2003); Daniel D. Garcia Swartz, Robert W. 
Hahn & Anne Layne-Farrar, The Economics of a Cashless Society: An 
Analysis of the Costs and Benefits of Payment Instruments, 5 REV. OF NET. 
ECON. 199, at 203, 208, 213-14 (2006), available at http://www.aei-
brookings.org/admin/authorpdfs/page.php?id=1048. 
 81   Id.; Guerin-Calvert & Ordover, supra note 74, at 26 (citing a 2004 study 
finding that the cost of processing a $100 transaction with a credit card was 
only 21 cents more than processing a cash transaction of a similar size). 
 82   Id. at 9. 
 83   Id.  
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networks take advantage of economies of scale and scope that are 
inaccessible to even the largest merchants or third-party 
providers.84 Substitute verification and authorization services are 
thus likely to be inferior to those provided by credit card 
networks and “substantially exceed the implicit price that 
merchants [now pay] . . . to payments networks.”85 The ancillary 
costs that merchants would have to bear if they did not accept 
credit cards could thus outweigh any additional out-of-pocket 
costs that those merchants must pay. The next section will look 
more broadly at the benefits that card acceptance provides to 
merchants. 
2. Potential for Wealth Transfers Considering Merchant 
Benefits 
The FRBB authors’ analysis attributes their predicted 
consumer welfare loss to merchant card acceptance fees, which 
the authors assume to be higher than the costs merchants bear 
when customers use other forms of payment. In that simple world 
where card acceptance simply increases costs, one might conclude 
that consumers would be better off without credit cards. 
Considering that merchants may receive benefits from cards that 
can impact overall pricing decisions and consumer welfare, the 
issue becomes more complicated. This sub-section considers how 
the benefits that merchants receive from accepting cards might 
benefit all consumers.  It then focuses on the FRBB authors’ 
claim that reward cards are the primary culprits in transferring 
wealth from low- to high-income households. 
a.  The Merchant Benefits of Credit Card Acceptance 
Credit card use provides a merchant with prompt, 
guaranteed payment and may, among other things, increase sales, 
reduce instances of non- and late-payment, lower theft insurance 
costs, and improve customer flow at the point of sale and various 
aspects of accounting.86 Although these benefits are almost 
                                                          
 84   Id. at 13-25 (reviewing the services credit card networks provide to 
merchants that would be more costly and less effective if merchants needed to 
acquire them from other sources). 
 85   Id. at 11-12. 
 86   Margaret E. Guerin-Calvert & Janusz A. Ordover, Merchant Benefits 
and Public Policy Towards Interchange: An Economic Assessment 4 REV. 
NETWORK ECON. 384, 387, 391-407 (2006). 
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certainly real and substantial, they are difficult, if not impossible, 
to measure precisely. A merchant may experience them in 
complex ways that evolve over time and that are difficult to 
isolate from other causes. As a result, the benefits of credit card 
use may be difficult even for the merchant itself to quantify. The 
cost of card acceptance is immediate, while the benefits of 
increased sales and savings from prompt payment and reduced 
default are delayed and difficult to isolate from other potential 
causes. For example, if a merchant begins accepting cards at the 
start of an economic downturn, purchase volume may fall, 
payments may be less timely, and default rates may increase in 
absolute terms. Card acceptance may nevertheless have lessened 
the impact of each negative event in ways that would be hard for 
the merchant to perceive, much less measure. Nevertheless, the 
merchant’s prices could be lower than they would have been if it 
had never accepted cards. 
Although a definitive empirical measure of the net costs of 
various means of payment will not be readily forthcoming, 
analysis may still shed light on the likelihood of significant wealth 
transfers. The most significant incremental benefit of credit card 
use is the potential to increase sales.87 Obviously, an easily 
accessible line of credit will enable some consumers to make 
purchases that they could not otherwise make because of then-
existing resource constraints and the relatively high cost of 
obtaining other forms of credit.88 In addition, some research 
indicates that psychological factors lead credit card users to spend 
more than they otherwise would, even when resource constraints 
do not exist.89 A 1996 Ernst and Young survey, for example, 
found that merchants have recognized this effect for some time: 
83% indicated that accepting credit cards would increase sales 
                                                          
   87   See infra Part IV.B.2.a. 
 88   Importantly, the cost of obtaining credit cannot be gauged solely by the 
interest rate. Convenience is also a critical factor. For example, both home 
equity and pay-day loans require substantial up-front investments of time and 
planning that are not required of customers using credit cards. 
 89  See Priya Raghubir & Joydeep Srivastava, Monopoly Money: The Effect 
of Payment Coupling and Form on Spending Behavior, 14 J. OF 
EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: APPLIED 213 (2008); see also Adam J. Levitin, The 
Antitrust Super Bowl: America’s Payment Systems, No-Surcharge Rules, and 
The Hidden Costs of Credit, 3 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 265, 288 (2005) (explaining 
that with credit cards consumers will “make more purchases because they feel 
less constrained in credit spending than they do when spending cash on hand”); 
Levitin, supra note 52, at 38-39. 
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and 58% thought accepting credit cards would increase profits.90 
Currently, business consultants are advising merchants that 
accepting cards will increase their sales, and an ever-growing 
collection of merchants appear to be reaching that conclusion.91 
Two long-time holdouts, The Waffle House and Neiman Marcus, 
recently agreed to accept credit cards,92 and New York City taxis 
reported that introducing card acceptance increased both 
ridership and tips substantially and, three years into the program, 
these effects have persisted and total revenue and the percentage 
of riders paying by card has increased significantly.93 There have 
been reports that accepting cards significantly increased the 
average amount spent at McDonald’s,94 and even the Salvation 
                                                          
 90   Chakravorti & Emmons, supra note 44, at 213 (citing Ernst & Young, 
Survey of Retail Payment Systems, Chain Store Age, (1996)). 
 91   Appendix at II.A. This article relies on data produced by Phoenix 
Marketing International through a broad survey of consumers about credit 
card and other payment methods. This survey data is cited throughout this 
article and is on file with the Consumer Law Review. 
See, e.g., Chris Rempel, Are You Losing Business by Only Accepting Cash and 
Checks,  http://ezinearticles.com/?Are-You-Losing-Business-by-Only-
Accepting-Cash-and-Checks?&id=669109. 
 92   Appendix at II.I & J. This article relies on data produced by Phoenix 
Marketing International through a broad survey of consumers about credit 
card and other payment methods. This survey data is cited throughout this 
article and is on file with the Consumer Law Review. 
  Nick Vagnoni, Waffle House to accept credit cards, SLASHFOOD (Feb. 21, 
2006) available at http://www.slashfood.com/2006/02/21/waffle-house-to-
accept-credit-cards; Dana Mattioli, Hoity-Toity to Hoi Polloi: Neiman Takes 
More Plastic, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 27, 2011) available at 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405297020450530457700010335567144
4.html. 
 93   Appendix at II.B. This article relies on data produced by Phoenix 
Marketing International through a broad survey of consumers about credit 
card and other payment methods. This survey data is cited throughout this 
article and is on file with the Consumer Law Review. Ted Mann, More Decide 
to Charge a Taxi Ride, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 27, 2012), available at 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405297020452020457724785069434984
4.html; Michael M. Grynbaum, New York’s Cabbies Like Credit Cards? Go 
Figure, N. Y. TIMES (Nov. 7, 2009), available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/08/nyregion/08taxi.html?_r=2&scp=2&sq=cr
edit%20card&st=cse&. 
 94   J.D. Roth, Research Reveals Credit Cards Encourage Spending, GET 
RICH SLOWLY (Sept. 23, 2008), 
http://www.getrichslowly.org/blog/2008/09/23/research-reveals-credit-cards-
encourage-spending. (quoting Cornell University economics professor Robert 
Frank as stating “When McDonald’s started allowing credit card purchases, 
the average purchase went from $4.50 up to $7.00”). 
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Army has experienced an increase in kettle donations during the 
holiday season after installing an option to donate using a card.95 
Reward cards are likely to increase spending even more 
than non-reward credit cards. After all, the Phoenix Marketing 
survey data confirms that reward cards effectively lower prices 
for the cardholders who use them.96 Interestingly, retail 
merchants and travel and entertainment companies apparently 
agree with credit card issuers that loyalty programs increase 
consumer spending, offering their own reward programs in 
numbers that outstrip those offered by financial service 
companies.97 In some cases, proprietary store cards offer rewards 
that are larger than those available from credit cards.98 To be 
sure, merchants capture all the gain from their own reward 
programs. The point, however, is that merchants recognize the 
value of these programs to their own marketing efforts and thus 
critics of reward cards should bear the burden of distinguishing 
financial services from other businesses with respect to the value 
of loyalty programs. In short, if merchants recognize that 
rewarding their customers helps expand their own businesses, 
similar programs should also be a good way to expand the credit 
                                                          
 95   Appendix at II.C.  This article relies on data produced by Phoenix 
Marketing International through a broad survey of consumers about credit 
card and other payment methods.  This survey data is cited throughout this 
article and is on file with the Consumer Law Review. Jessica Leving, 
Salvation Army kettles can now accept credit cards, USA TODAY (Nov. 26, 
2011) available at http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/2009-11-26-
salvation-army-credit-cards_N.htm. 
 96   See Phoenix Marketing Survey Data on file with the Consumer Law 
Review. 
 97   Appendix at II.D. This article relies on data produced by Phoenix 
Marketing International through a broad survey of consumers about credit 
card and other payment methods.  This survey data is cited throughout this 
article and is on file with the Consumer Law Review. Leo Jakobson, Retailers 
Hold Lion’s Share of U.S. Loyalty Program Memberships, INCENTIVE: WHAT 
MOTIVATES (June 16, 2009) available at 
http://www.incentivemag.com/Incentive-
Programs/Consumer/Articles/Retailers-Hold-Lion-s-Share-of-U-S—Loyalty-
Program-Memberships/. 
 98   Appendix at II.F.  This article relies on data produced by Phoenix 
Marketing International through a broad survey of consumers about credit 
card and other payment methods.  This survey data is cited throughout this 
article and is on file with the Consumer Law Review.  (For example, Best Buy 
offers a reward card offering four percent).  FINANCING & AWARDS, BEST 
BUY,  http://www.bestbuy.com/site/Finance/Credit-
Cards/pcmcat102500050032.c?id=pcmcat102500050032 (last visited Oct. 26, 
2012). 
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card business. 
If credit card use and rewards increase consumer 
spending, it could effectively lower retail prices. Higher sales 
levels would enable retailers to spread their fixed costs over 
greater sales volume. This cost spreading and savings would tend 
to reduce retail prices. If credit cards lead to sufficient increases 
in customer spending, the benefits to merchants could outweigh 
the incremental out-of-pocket costs of credit cards, and a 
merchant that starts accepting credit cards might thus leave its 
retail prices the same or even lower them despite higher out-of-
pocket card acceptance fees.99 
Precisely the same analysis would apply to merchants who 
are able to secure payments more quickly and avoid defaults by 
accepting credit cards. A merchant could reduce its own 
borrowing costs and losses due to non-payment as well as costs 
associated with pursuing customers who would eventually pay 
without credit cards, but pay more quickly with them. And again, 
the merchant could spread its fixed costs over more (and more 
timely) completed sales. 
One might be tempted to argue that credit cards must 
have lower net costs than other forms of payment, because if they 
did not, merchants would simply refuse to accept them. 
Economists have cautioned, however, that a particular 
merchant’s perceived increase in sales volume as a result of credit 
card acceptance may be the result of shifting sales among 
merchants rather than actual increases in consumption levels. 
This is true because merchants use card acceptance strategically 
in order to attract sales away from, and avoid losing sales to, their 
competitors. This strategic behavior provides the merchant a 
private benefit – sales that would otherwise have gone to 
competitors – but not necessarily an increase in total consumer 
spending.100 As a result, a merchant may accept cards despite a 
                                                          
 99   Levitin, supra note 52, at 28 (recognizing the credit card use could lead 
to lower prices if it “increases sales sufficiently”).   
 100  See Katz, supra note 39, at 26-27; id. at 10 (“An individual merchant 
may recognize that failure to accept a major general purpose credit card would 
lead potential customers to patronize rival merchants that accept those 
customers’ preferred cards. Hence, from the individual merchant’s 
perspective, card acceptance generates significant additional sales benefits. 
The benefits to the overall economy, however, depend on the effects on 
merchants as a whole (in addition to effects on consumers). It is easy to see that 
the collective effects may be very different from the individual effects. The 
reason, of course, is that the merchant’s acceptance decision may have 
negative effects on rival merchants; the merchant accepts credit cards in part 
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net cost above other means of payment, because failing to accept 
them would lead to lost sales that would reduce profits even more 
than card acceptance. 
If merchants in a particular industry accept cards for 
strategic reasons, prices throughout that industry could be higher 
with credit card acceptance than without it.  Nevertheless, non-
credit card users may still be better off if the stores at which they 
shop accept credit cards. To understand why this is true, assume 
that a merchant accepts cards only because it believes that it has 
to do so to avoid losing customers to competitive merchants. Such 
a merchant would know that card acceptance would cost more 
than other means of payment and any increase in sales or other 
benefits would not outweigh the higher incremental out-of-pocket 
cost. Nevertheless, the merchant counter-intuitively chooses to 
accept cards because failing to do so would cause it to lose sales to 
competitors, reducing its profits, and forcing it to increase its 
prices on remaining sales to cover its fixed costs, to an even 
greater extent than would card acceptance. 
In this case, the merchant’s prices with credit card 
acceptance would be higher than they would be in a hypothetical 
world in which no merchant in the industry accepted credit cards. 
In the real world in which competitors do accept cards, however, 
prices would be lower if the merchant also accepts them. From 
the perspective of non-card customers, if some stores accept credit 
cards, then non-credit card users would be better off when the 
stores at which they shop also accept them. This is particularly 
true given that most consumers are not strictly card users or non-
card users. Virtually all consumers use multiple means of 
payment, including credit cards.101 Even those who usually pay 
another way benefit from the option to use a credit card when 
they need to. 
This conclusion depends on the relationship between the 
effect of card acceptance on merchant sales and the incremental 
costs of accepting cards. Minimal data exists shedding light on 
this question, but both (a) the paucity of non-credit-card-
accepting merchants in most retail sectors and (b) the 
continuously expanding base of merchants across business sectors 
                                                          
to take business away from its rivals. Thus, the collective benefits of a 
merchant’s accepting credit and charge cards may be much lower than the 
merchant’s individual benefits”). 
   101   See Phoenix Marketing Survey Data on file with the Consumer Law 
Review. 
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that have begun taking payments with cards suggests that card 
acceptance by a particular retailer leads to higher profits and 
potentially lower prices whether or not other merchants in that 
sector accept credit cards. If a merchant could actually charge a 
significantly lower price, and thereby maintain or increase its 
sales and profits by not accepting cards, one would expect to see 
non-credit-card-accepting merchants seeking to attract 
consumers by under-cutting the prices of credit-accepting 
merchants.102 Although merchant fees have moved up and down 
over time, even during periods of substantial increases,103 retailers 
virtually never pursue this competitive response. In fact, the 
trend in card acceptance has been in the opposite direction. Retail 
sectors that previously did not accept credit cards –supermarkets, 
convenience stores, utilities, insurance companies, and health 
care providers – now do, while no sector, or individual major 
retailer, has stopped accepting credit cards because of fee 
increases.104 
b.  Wealth Transfers With Merchant Benefits & Rewards 
The FRBB authors do not recommend eliminating card 
acceptance. Instead, they focus their attack on reward cards. One 
might contend that even if merchants benefit from card 
acceptance generally in ways that lower consumer prices, the 
                                                          
 102  Joshua S. Gans & Stephen P. King, The Neutrality of Interchange Fees 
in Payment Systems 21 (Melbourne Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 2001-03, 
2001), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=276228#PaperDownload 
(“the cash price from a credit card merchant will also make cash-only 
merchants appear to be relatively cheap for those customers that use cash as 
well as credit”).   
 103  United States v. VISA U.S.A. Inc., 163 F. Supp.2d 322, 340 (S.D.N.Y. 
2001) (finding that “both Visa and MasterCard have recently raised 
interchange rates charged to merchants a number of times, without losing a 
single merchant customer as a result”); see Evans & Schmalensee, supra note 
21, at 126; James M. Lyon, The Interchange Fee Debate: Issues and 
Economics, FED. RES. BANK OF MINNEAPOLIS: THE REGION, June 2006, 
available at http://www.minneapolisfed.org/pubs/region/06-06/ 
interchange.cfm. 
 104  VISA U.S.A., 163 F. Supp.2d at 340 (finding that merchants have not 
stopped accepting credit cards despite fee increases); but see Katz, supra note 
39, at 24 (finding that economies of scale may require merchants to accept 
cards in markets that are too small to support separate credit-card and non-
credit card merchants. But economies of scale cannot explain the paucity of 
non-credit-card merchants even in big cities).  
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FRBB authors might still reasonably assume that merchants 
receive no net benefit from card rewards. Virtually all purchases 
made with a reward card, they might contend, would still be 
made even if the merchant did not accept the card because the 
customer could always use a less expensive ordinary credit 
card.105 The incremental cost of reward cards would thus lead to 
a wealth transfer because high-income households use the most 
expensive reward cards.106 
Reward cards, however, may well provide merchants with 
incremental sales increases that would not occur in a market 
without them. Cardholders earning rewards effectively face a 
lower price for the products and services that they buy. Available 
data from the Phoenix Marketing Survey of consumer payment 
system use reflects that spending is higher on reward cards than 
non-reward cards.107 
Even if reward cards do not increase overall spending, 
however, non-card-using consumers are still likely to be better off 
if a merchant accepts them.  If one merchant stopped accepting 
reward cards, it would likely lose sales to competitors that 
strategically continued to accept them in order to attract the 
business of reward-card-holding high-income households.108 The 
reward-card-refusing merchant would lose the patronage of some 
of its best customers, possibly causing it to raise its prices to cover 
its fixed costs, and leaving non-reward card users worse off than 
they would have been if the merchant had simply accepted all 
credit cards. 
This analysis cannot establish that the merchants’ benefits 
of card acceptance at current usage and fee levels in fact enable 
those merchants to charge lower prices than they would if they 
did not accept credit cards generally (or reward cards in 
                                                          
 105  Levitin, supra note 52, at 15-16. (arguing many of the same policy 
proposals as the FRBB authors).  
 106  Id. at 34-35. 
 107  Appendix at I.I. This article relies on data produced by Phoenix 
Marketing International through a broad survey of consumers about credit 
card and other payment methods. This survey data is cited throughout this 
article and is on file with the Consumer Law Review. 
 108  Barron et al., supra note 36, at 16, 18-19 (explaining that the decision to 
offer cash discounts depended on the relative elasticity of cash and credit 
customers which differed across stations. Interestingly, this is exactly what 
happened in the gasoline retailing market when it experimented with cash 
discounts. While some stations trumped discounts for cash purchases, others, 
including those selling under the banner of the giant Shell Oil, touted the same 
price for cash or credit). 
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particular). Given the relatively small differences in out-of-pocket 
costs between credit cards and other means of payment, however, 
the potential ancillary cost savings and benefits identified here 
create at least a reasonable possibility that credit card acceptance 
leads to lower prices in some retail markets. Furthermore, the 
disappearance of non-credit-card-accepting merchants across the 
economy suggests that even if credit cards increase prices overall, 
a particular merchant’s refusal to accept them would cause it to 
increase its prices even more. In a world that includes reward 
credit cards, non-reward-card users are likely to be better off if 
the stores at which they shop accept them. 
c. Credit Card System Bank Benefits 
In addition to ignoring merchant benefits, the FRBB 
authors’ analysis does not account for the benefits of card 
rewards to banks. Credit card systems operated for many years 
without reward programs, and no network rule requires card 
issuers to offer them. Just as merchants choose to accept cards for 
a reason, the banks choose to offer reward programs because they 
perceive some benefit that is unaccounted for in the FRBB policy 
paper’s analysis. 
Although the authors did not incorporate bank benefits 
into their original analysis, they later assumed that reward 
programs increase bank profits and benefit the primarily high-
income households that hold bank stock.109 They thus concluded 
that incorporating bank benefits into their analysis would 
exacerbate the wealth transfer. But that view inappropriately 
focuses narrowly on distributed profits. Banks reinvest credit 
card system profits in ways that benefit all consumers, such as 
more effective fraud protection, enhanced security, and systems 
that speed up transactions at the point of sale. 
Most obviously, reward programs that stimulate card 
usage have made card networks larger and more efficient, 
thereby lowering the networks’ operating costs. Perhaps more 
significantly, a bank may offer a card rewards program because it 
enables the bank to increase revenue from financing purchases 
and cardholder fees. By offering rewards, for example, banks 
may entice cardholders to pay an annual fee that they would not 
otherwise pay or run larger balances then they otherwise would. 
                                                          
 109  Schuh et al. 2011, supra note 1, at 20 (assuming that the distribution of 
ownership of bank stock was similar to the distribution of stocks generally). 
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The Phoenix International Marketing consumer survey confirms 
that card issuers earn more revenue from these sources than they 
do from merchant fees.110 
Banks may then use this revenue – which is attributable, 
directly or indirectly, to reward programs – to expand services 
and offer new and improved products (relating to credit cards 
and otherwise) that could benefit all consumers. 
Merchants often contend that a more efficient card system 
should have led to lower merchant fees, but competitive markets 
do not work in such a static way. Banks must approach the credit 
card market dynamically, constantly focusing on the competitive 
steps that will best improve the system. If lowering merchant fees 
would more efficiently expand the system, banks would 
undoubtedly lower those fees. The card systems’ unqualified 
success, however, testifies to the correctness of the banks’ 
decision to focus generally on expanding services to cardholders 
rather than lowering merchant fees. 
The banking sector innovations made possible by a more 
profitable credit card system could benefit low-income 
households more than high-income households, thus 
counteracting the wealth transfer predicted by the FRBB policy 
paper. For example, greater credit card use benefits banks by 
making cards attractive to more merchants, increasing card 
transaction volume and presumably card borrowing. In recent 
years, this benefit has been realized as new merchant sectors have 
begun accepting credit cards, including utilities, medical service 
providers, taxing authorities, and insurance companies. These 
sectors, which generally provide non-discretionary products, may 
not value the credit component of the card system to expand sales 
as traditional retailers do. Nevertheless, cards may benefit these 
merchants in other ways, including enabling their customers to 
make more timely payments, and decreasing non-payment and 
default risk, as well as collection costs. In short, credit card use 
shifts these costs and risks from merchants to banks, an extremely 
valuable benefit. 
Low-income households may be more likely to face cash 
flow issues leading to late payment or default, the penalties 
attendant thereto, and ultimately reduced credit ratings. These 
low-income customers are thus more likely to benefit from 
expanded card acceptance for non-discretionary spending than 
                                                          
 110  Appendix at I.D through H. See Phoenix Marketing Survey Data on 
file with the Consumer Law Review. 
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high-income households. Although they use credit cards less often 
than high-income households, the ability to pay merchants in 
these sectors that are new to card acceptance with a credit card 
could enable low-income households to avoid late payment and 
maintain or even improve their credit ratings – the latter of which 
would reduce the low-income households’ future costs of 
borrowing. 
d. Non-credit Card Customer Benefits 
The FRBB authors assume that credit card use benefits 
only those who receive rewards. Allocating and assessing the 
value of a means of payment to all customers, however, is a much 
more complex endeavor. First, the costs and benefits of one 
payment mechanism often spill over, impacting customers who 
use other means of payment in ways that go beyond retail prices 
and rewards.111 An example of an easily observable spillover 
involves cash acceptance. Some supermarkets now use change 
dispensers that speed up checkout lines. Although this cost is 
directly attributable to the merchant’s acceptance of cash, the 
benefits of faster check-out times extend to all customers. 
Similarly, when increased credit card use reduces a merchant’s 
cash handling costs, late- and non-payment expenses (such as 
bounced check expenses), and theft losses, all customers 
benefit.112 
                                                          
 111  See Guerin-Calvert & Ordover, supra note 86, at 387, 391-407 (“It is 
not at all clear that these complex bundles of benefits can be neatly converted 
into a ‘per transaction’ benefit with a well-calibrated cost”); Katz, supra note 
39, at 35 (“card based transactions may have costs and benefits for both sides 
of the market simultaneously, many costs are common”). 
 112  Although these types of benefits could be obtained with other 
electronic forms of payment, such as pin-based debit cards, that would impose 
lower out-of-pocket costs on merchants once the technology for acceptance is 
installed, the same level of benefits would not be obtained without credit 
cards. Debit card use would be unlikely to replace reduced credit card use on a 
dollar-for-dollar basis for at least three reasons: 
(1)  many consumers need, or prefer, the float period or revolving credit 
offered by credit cards; 
(2)  others value the security of  maintaining their level of cash on hand in case 
an emergency expense arises for which they cannot use a credit card; and 
(3)  some fear that fraudulent use of their debit card would have more severe 
consequences than credit card fraud. With respect to this last factor, the most 
significant difference is that debit fraud can empty the cardholder’s checking 
account, leaving her without access to her money for some indeterminable 
period of time. By contrast, credit card fraud does not raise that concern 
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Second, the FRBB authors’ data shows that consumers 
use reward cards sometimes at all wealth levels. The majority of 
consumers – again at all wealth levels – however, choose not to 
use reward credit cards for the majority of their purchases. The 
FRBB authors do not contend that these consumer payment 
decisions are irrational. On the contrary, consumers likely make 
considered decisions about which payment system to use based 
on the welfare that each provides to them with respect to 
particular purchases. Just as merchants choose to accept 
particular means of payment because of the perceived benefits, 
consumers use payment mechanisms other than reward credit 
cards in the circumstances in which they perceive a net benefit 
from doing so. 
Although these benefits are difficult to quantify, they are 
relatively easy to predict. Recall that the authors place consumers 
using debit cards, proprietary store cards, gift cards, and checks 
as well as cash, in the same category. Many consumers use debit 
cards instead of credit cards because they do not want to take on 
a credit balance and are concerned that, if given the option to 
revolve, they will not pay their credit card bill in full. These 
consumers, however, often do use credit cards when they need to 
extend payments. More extensive use of credit cards by others 
ensures that a safe and efficient system is available when these 
consumers choose to use it. 
Moreover, debit card users may also receive rewards. And 
proprietary store cards may offer rewards that are greater than 
credit cards.113 Cash purchasers may simply enjoy being the 
customer who uses cash when others are using cards. If these 
benefits did not exist, many consumers who now choose not to 
use reward credit cards would likely use them, reducing the 
FRBB authors’ predicted welfare transfer. 
The authors’ failure to consider the spillover benefits of 
reward card use causes them to overstate any potential wealth 
transfer. Moreover, their failure to take account of the 
individualized benefits received by those choosing not to use a 
reward credit card casts doubt on whether any transfer the 
authors may show is actually a “wealth transfer” in any 
meaningful sense.  The consumers who are said to be losing 
                                                          
because a credit card issuer has no direct access to the cardholder’s deposit 
accounts. 
 113  Appendix at II.F (showing example of the Best Buy credit card); see 
BEST BUY, supra note 98. 
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wealth through reward card use choose a different means of 
payment because they believe that it provides them greater 
benefits than they would receive if they used a reward card. 
e. The Impact of Ignoring the Benefits of Payment System 
Choices 
The benefits of payment system choices impact how 
reward credit cards affect welfare. Yet, the FRBB authors ignore 
many of these benefits.  Given that their analysis only takes 
account of card rewards and redistributed profits to wealthy 
stockholders, the authors’ prediction that a wealth transfer favors 
high-income households is as unsurprising as it is unilluminating. 
To be sure, many of the benefits of payment system choices are 
difficult to measure, and the authors’ goal was to make precise 
consumer welfare predictions. That goal, however, may simply be 
unachievable. “It is not at all clear,” economists Meg Guerin-
Calvert and Jansuz Ordover have observed, “that complex of 
bundles of benefits [resulting from credit card use] can be neatly 
converted into a ‘per transaction’ benefit with a well-calibrated 
cost.”114 As Michael Katz has explained “card based transactions 
may have costs and benefits for both sides of the market 
simultaneously, many costs are common.”115 
The analysis presented here cannot establish that reward 
credit card use increases consumer welfare. But it does show that 
a meaningful assessment of consumer welfare would require 
analysts to consider inputs that the FRBB authors ignore. 
Payment system markets are not a zero sum game; the amount 
and size of transactions are not independent of the choice of 
payment mechanism.116 To the extent that cardholders would 
                                                          
 114  Guerin-Calvert & Ordover, supra note 86, at 387. 
 115  Katz, supra note 39, at 35. 
 116  Ronald J. RONALD J. MANN, CHARGING AHEAD: THE GROWTH AND 
REGULATION OF PAYMENT CARD MARKETS 48 (2006); Ronald J. Levitin, 
supra note 52, at 38-39 (citing studies); Levitin, supra note 89, at 288 
(explaining that with credit cards consumers will “make more purchases 
because they feel less constrained in credit spending than they do when 
spending cash on hand”).  Although the strength of this effect is apparently 
difficult to prove  it seems likely to be substantial.  Katz, supra note 39, at 9-12, 
19 (questioning whether credit cards really increase overall spending).  If it 
were not, one would expect to see cash-only merchants emerge to take 
advantage of the cost savings that such merchants could provide to consumers. 
Cf. Gans & King, supra note 102, at 21 (“the cash price from a credit card 
merchant will also make cash-only merchants appear to be relatively cheap for 
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switch away from credit cards if rewards were reduced or 
eliminated, the FRBB authors predict that merchant card 
acceptance costs and retail prices would drop accordingly. But 
when consumers stop using reward cards, they are likely to spend 
less and impose other types of costs, such as bad check losses, on 
merchants. These costs and lost revenue would restrain a 
merchant’s ability to cut its prices by the full amount of the 
reduction in card acceptance fees. The impact of the authors’ 
proposed regulatory interventions on consumer welfare is thus 
highly uncertain. 
V. ADDITIONAL ASSUMPTIONS DRIVING THE FRBB 
AUTHORS’ CONSUMER-WELFARE CALCULATION 
The previous section addressed the effect of the FRBB 
policy paper’s failure to take account of the full spectrum of 
benefits, other than credit card rewards, flowing to merchants, 
banks, and non-credit card customers from existing payment 
system choices. This section shows that even if those effects could 
plausibly be ignored in calculating changes to consumer welfare – 
which they cannot – the FRBB paper’s predictions would still 
rest on a set of arbitrary assumptions about the value of payment 
system choices and of shifting wealth between income groups. 
First, the FRBB authors assume that merchants pay card 
acceptance fees of approximately 2% and face a cost of .5% to 
handle cash, a category in which they include all means of 
payment other than credit cards.117 Merchants’ out-of-pocket 
costs to accept different means of payment vary across merchant 
types, and the authors acknowledge that their figures are “very 
rough.”118 They cite research estimating the cost of accepting non-
credit-card payment mechanisms along a range from .5% to 
1.6%.119 Without attempting to evaluate rigorously the accuracy 
of these numbers, the authors adopt the lower end of the range, 
maximizing the possibility that they will overstate any wealth 
transfer. To the extent that merchant costs for (1) non-credit card 
transactions are higher or (2) credit card transactions are lower, 
                                                          
those customers that use cash as well as credit”).  In fact, the trend has been 
entirely in the opposite direction as more and more merchants accept credit 
cards. 
   117  Schuh et al. 2011, supra note 1, at 11. 
 118  Id. at 12. 
 119  Id. 
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the FRBB authors’ calculations would overstate any wealth 
transfer and thus any change in consumer welfare. One reason to 
suspect that the authors’ assumption understates the merchant 
costs of the payment mechanisms used by low-income households 
is that those households use debit cards more often than high-
income households, leveling out card use considerably across 
income groups.120  
The merchant cost of accepting debit cards may be higher 
than the cost of cash, and consumers are often rewarded for debit 
card use. By lumping debit card use in with cash use, the FRBB 
authors may overstate the differences in payment system costs 
imposed on merchants between high- and low-income groups. 
Second, the authors assume that merchants generally 
charge a single price for their goods and services regardless of the 
means of payment. Although they cite no hard data establishing 
the accuracy of this assumption, it appears to comport with 
general experience. But exceptions exist. Some small merchants 
offer cash discounts, and many large retail stores offer proprietary 
store cards (which fall on the “cash” side of the FRBB authors’ 
analysis) that provide rewards and other significant consumer 
benefits.121 To the extent that these programs lead merchants to 
charge credit card purchasers more than customers using other 
payment mechanisms, the authors’ wealth transfer and consumer 
welfare predictions are again overstated. 
Third, and perhaps most critically, the FRBB authors’ 
accounting exercise predicts only a transfer of money, not 
welfare.  Their hard data fails to show any inefficiency or dead 
weight loss that would make consumers objectively worse off. 
The authors simply conclude that dollars flow from one pocket to 
another because of the choices that merchants and consumers 
make about which payment mechanisms to accept and use, 
respectively. 
To make the broader claim that this monetary transfer 
                                                          
 120  Appendix at I.B.C. (See Phoenix Marketing International Survey Data 
on file with the Consumer Law Review (showing that 94-97% of households 
have a credit or debit card at all income levels above $20,000 annually, and 
83% of households below that level have one type of card or the other). 
 121  Appendix at II.E. (See Phoenix Marketing International Survey Data 
on file with the Consumer Law Review, for example, Macy’s offers a 20 
percent discount on the day a new card account is opened). See CREDIT CARD 
APPLICATION, MACY’S, 
https://www.macys.com/service/credit/applynow/creditapp.ognc (last visited 
Oct. 26, 2012). 
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reduces overall consumer welfare, the authors must move beyond 
calculations based on hard data and assume two contestable, if 
not entirely arbitrary, facts about consumer preferences. First, 
they assume that preferences for card use are uniformly 
distributed across consumers. Second, they assume that money 
held by low-income households produces a specific amount of 
additional overall welfare compared to money held by high-
income households. These two assumptions are both critical to 
their conclusions and independent from the data on which they 
rely. Changes to either one could dramatically change their 
calculations of the consumer welfare impact of card usage. 
With respect to the distribution of consumer preferences 
for card use, the data show how often consumers at various 
income levels choose to use credit cards or alternative means of 
payment.  But the data say nothing about the relative preference 
levels of various consumers for the alternative means of payment. 
The FRBB authors assume that the strength of the preference for 
a means of payment is uniform across all consumers regardless of 
income, which impacts their specific consumer welfare 
predictions.122 
The authors fail to articulate a reason to believe that this 
assumption is true. Preferences could reasonably be distributed in 
other ways that would significantly influence the FRBB authors’ 
welfare predictions. For example, many high-income consumers 
choosing to use credit cards could have a very slight preference 
for them because they use cards only for marginal convenience 
benefits or rewards, while low-income consumers choosing 
another means of payment might have a very strong preference 
such as the need to manage their use of credit. When this is the 
case, consumer welfare would not change as a result of card use 
in the way that the authors predict. Similarly, because consumers 
in both income groups often choose both means of payment, it is 
possible that the low-income consumers who use credit cards 
have much stronger preferences for them than the high-income 
consumers who use cards. This might occur if low-income 
households perceived card rewards as particularly welcome 
windfalls generating more utility for them than the higher 
absolute reward payments generate for high-income households. 
The negative welfare effects of denying these benefits to the low-
wealth consumers who use reward cards could potentially 
outweigh any benefits to low-wealth consumers who use cash, 
                                                          
 122  Schuh et al. 2011, supra note 1, at 27 fig. 3. 
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particularly if other flaws in the FRBB Report’s analysis reduce 
the magnitude of the transfer. 
The point here is not that either of these possible 
distributions of consumer preferences is necessarily more likely to 
be accurate than the one chosen by the FRBB authors. It is 
simply that no one knows, and the value one chooses has a 
significant impact on the predicted welfare changes. The impact 
of regulatory intervention would thus be uncertain. 
This uncertainty is magnified by the variability of another 
critical component of the FRBB authors’ welfare calculations. 
Recall that the authors accounting exercise predicts a simple 
movement of money from one pocket to another, rather than an 
overall welfare loss to the economy. If one dollar produced the 
same amount of welfare regardless of who had it, the authors’ 
transfer predictions would have no impact whatsoever on 
aggregate consumer welfare. To obtain a welfare impact, they 
must assume that a dollar is worth more to a low-income 
household than to a high-income household. That assumption is 
hardly implausible, but it is nonetheless problematic on three 
levels. 
First, assuming that low-income households value a dollar 
more than high-income households creates a paradox. Why 
would households valuing money more choose to use payment 
mechanisms that cost them more? The reason is not that low-
income households have no access to credit cards. Although the 
limits and terms are set based on the risk posed and card issuer 
policies differ widely, in almost all cases, even low-income 
households could use credit cards.123 But they nonetheless choose 
to use them less often than high-income households. Two 
plausible reasons for that choice would undermine the FRBB 
policy paper’s welfare predictions: (1) credit card rewards are 
                                                          
 123  Levitin, supra note 52, at 14 (“almost anyone who wants a rewards 
card can get one.”); see id. at 6 (Phoenix Marketing Group chart showing that 
consumers hold a higher percentage of reward cards than non-reward cards at 
all income groups). Even individuals who have recently declared bankruptcy 
have no problem obtaining credit cards, though many choose not to.  
Katherine Porter, The Debt Dilemma: Reviewing Ronald J. Mann, Charging 
Ahead: The Growth and Regulation of Payment Card Markets (2006), 106 
MICH. L. REV. 1167, 1170 (2008) (explaining that “nearly every consumer has 
access to a credit card. Card issuers have used price differentiation and 
technology to offer cards to nearly every segment of the market, a strategy that 
banks have not deployed for many conventional lending products.”); id. at 
1181 (recognizing that “the rampant marketing of credit cards to families after 
bankruptcy means nearly everyone can get a credit card”). 
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valued much less highly than the paper makes them out to be, 
and perhaps are valued even less highly by low-income than by 
high-income households, or (2) low-income households do not 
systematically garner more welfare from consumption than high-
income households. 
Second, making interpersonal utility comparisons is not a 
matter of traditional economics, which instead tends to focus on 
more objective criteria like Pareto optimality or economic 
efficiency.  The reason for this typical restraint in economic 
analysis is that it is impossible to know how one should value a 
shift in levels of utility across individuals without making an 
arbitrary assumption.124 
Third, even if one agreed that relative welfare levels could 
appropriately be incorporated into an economic analysis of 
welfare transfers, the question would remain as to the magnitude 
of the effect. The FRBB authors acknowledge that they have no 
tools capable of answering that question. Ultimately, they 
conclude that this parameter in their analysis “can be interpreted 
equivalently as a measure of the economy’s aversion to income 
inequality.”125 But the economy is not inherently averse to 
inequality. Societies must make value judgments about it, and 
many assumptions differing from the authors would (1) be 
entirely plausible and (2) significantly impact the welfare effects 
that they predict. 
The bottom line is that even if the authors took account of 
all the relevant factors in payment system markets – which they 
do not – their specific consumer welfare predictions would 
ultimately rest not on the hard data that they have gathered, but 
on arbitrary and controversial assumptions about consumer and 
                                                          
 124  KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES 10-11 
(2d ed. 1963), available at http://cowles.econ.yale.edu/P/cm/m12-2/m12-2-
all.pdf. A half century ago, Nobel Laureate Kenneth Arrow explained the 
problem with basing analysis on inter-personal utility comparisons. Even if, 
for some reason, we should admit the measurability of utility for an individual, 
there still remains the question of aggregating the individual utilities. . . . In 
general there seems to be no method intrinsic to utility measurement, which 
will make the choices compatible. It requires a definite value judgment not 
derivable from individual sensations to make the utilities of different 
individuals dimensionally compatible and still a further value judgment to 
aggregate them according to any particular mathematical formula. If we look 
away from the mathematical aspects of the matter, it seems to make no sense 
to add the utility of one individual, a psychic magnitude in his mind, with the 
utility of another individual. 
 125  Schuh et al. 2011, supra note 1, at 33. 
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societal preferences. 
VI.  THE UBIQUITY OF WEALTH TRANSFER EFFECTS IN 
RETAIL MARKETS 
The preceding parts of this paper questioned whether 
significant cross subsidies and consumer-welfare shifts exist as a 
result of reward credit card use. This section explains that 
marketing programs apparently favoring wealthy consumers are 
pervasive throughout the retail economy, and the FRBB authors 
ignore the question of why regulators should intervene in credit 
card markets, but not in any other retail environment producing 
an ostensibly similar wealth transfer effect. Other commentators 
have attempted to distinguish credit card markets from others in 
which similar transfers may occur. This part illustrates that these 
efforts have failed. To the extent that payment system markets 
differ from other retail markets, regulatory intervention is less 
justifiable in the case of credit cards. 
A.  The Apparent Wealth Transfer Phenomenon 
Marketing programs across many sectors of the economy 
ostensibly have potential wealth transfer effects similar to those 
predicted by the FRBB Report. For example, airline frequent 
flier programs likely benefit high-wealth fliers more than low-
wealth fliers. Just as merchants charge the same price for goods 
and services regardless of means of payment, airlines use the 
same fee schedule irrespective of whether a traveler will ever 
benefit from a frequent flier reward. 
Similarly, many retail merchants offer rewards to frequent 
purchasers or proprietary credit card holders. Large supermarket 
chains offer discount cards that reward customers who use them 
regularly with lower prices than other consumers pay. For 
example, Macy’s and Best Buy offer their own credit cards that 
include special benefits not available to general-purpose card 
users.126 High-income households may well derive more benefits 
from these programs to the extent that they buy more, and more 
expensive, goods. These programs impose costs on merchants just 
as credit card acceptance imposes costs. If credit cards impose a 
wealth transfer, then these programs must as well. 
A different sort of wealth transfer could arise whenever a 
                                                          
 126  Appendix II.F. See BEST BUY, supra note 98. 
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merchant operates multiple locations facing different levels of 
competition. For example, a grocery chain may have (a) one store 
in a high-income area with numerous competitors in the 
geographic market and (b) a second store in a poor area without 
any other groceries. The chain would be expected to charge 
higher prices in the poor area, effectively transferring wealth 
across income groups. 
More fundamentally, pervasive consumer amenities have 
similar wealth transfer effects. Merchants selling at a unitary 
price virtually always provide penumbral products and services 
bundled together with their primary wares. For example, when a 
supermarket, clothier, or home repair store offers shopping carts 
that only certain customers use, the merchant bears the expense 
of purchasing and maintaining the carts as well as the cost of 
hiring laborers to gather them from the parking lot.127 Like credit 
card fees, the cost of the carts and the attendant services are 
blended into the cost of the merchant’s goods and are thus borne 
in part by shoppers who buy just a few items and use a bag or 
basket. Cart users who would presumably spend more, thus enjoy 
a subsidy. 
While many of these amenities may not transfer wealth 
between income groups, some apparently do. Parking lots, for 
example, are a commonly provided benefit that many retail 
merchants make available to their customers free of charge. 
Wealthy customers with cars take full advantage of the parking 
lot, while low-income customers who walk or take the bus 
cannot. Since the costs of maintaining the parking lot are blended 
into the merchant’s prices – free parking is never really free – 
wealth is transferred toward more affluent consumers with cars. 
Those who walk effectively pay so that those with cars can park 
for free. 
Similar amenities – rest rooms, napkins etc. – are 
pervasive, but this practice extends beyond these add-ons to core 
aspects of the merchant’s business as fundamental as the array of 
products offered.  Many merchants carry a variety of goods 
appealing to different customer groups. To the extent that 
inventory costs are uniformly spread across products, those who 
                                                          
 127  David S. Evans, Bank Interchange Fees Balance Dual Demand, AM. 
BANKER 17 (Jan. 26, 2001) (“All customers end up paying higher prices as a 
result of retailers offering parking, tailoring, escalators, convenient store hours, 
gift-wrapping, and many other amenities that are used by only some 
customers”). 
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never purchase items that are more expensive to inventory 
subsidize those who buy these high-storage-cost products. 
Similarly, a retailer may earn different levels of profit 
depending on the type of service provided. For example, 
automobile maintenance shops specializing in oil changes may 
advertise a low price to change the oil, hoping to convince 
customers at the point of sale to also buy a replacement air filter 
at a much higher mark up. Customers who only purchase the less 
profitable advertised services benefit from subsidies paid by those 
who purchase the more profitable services. 
Every customer sub-group that  benefits from some 
particular merchant expenditure effectively imposes a portion of 
the merchant’s cost of doing business on other groups of 
customers who do not benefit from that expenditure. At its limit, 
one might argue that, because small purchases generally impose a 
greater proportionate cost on merchants than large ones, the 
wealthy who tend to make bigger purchases effectively subsidize 
poorer consumers who purchase fewer items. 
Economic regulators pervasively ignore merchants’ 
blending costs into unitary prices in ways that shift wealth. That 
practice counsels against concluding that a similar transfer 
should be addressed in payment system markets, unless card 
acceptance costs differ in some relevant way from other sorts of 
merchant expenditures. The following sections show that to the 
extent any differences exist, they weigh against intervention in 
credit card markets. 
B.  Attempts to Distinguish Credit Card Wealth Transfers 
Although the FRBB authors ignore the pervasive nature 
of wealth transfers, other commentators have suggested three 
ways in which card acceptance may differ from other potentially 
wealth-transferring merchant expenditures. The following sub-
sections assess these claims, concluding that they fail to justify 
condemning credit card rewards either because no real distinction 
exists or because any distinction weighs more heavily in favor of 
intervening in markets other than credit cards. 
1. Distinguishing Credit Cards Based on the Entity Deciding 
Whether to Allocate the Cost 
Some commentators have argued that retailers usually 
decide for themselves whether to pass a particular expense on to 
all customers through a unitary price or only to those customers 
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benefiting from the expenditure. For example, if a retailer pays a 
shipper to deliver goods to a customer, the retailer decides 
whether to allocate a separate charge for shipping or to provide 
free shipping, which blends the cost into its general prices. A 
common practice is to provide free shipping on more profitable 
larger orders, but to allocate shipping separately for less 
profitable small orders. To the extent that high-income 
households place a disproportionate number of large orders, this 
practice transfers wealth toward high-income households. 
Intervention is generally believed to be unjustified in these cases 
because the merchant may exercise its business judgment to 
operate its business as it chooses. 
Credit cards are different, these commentators claim, 
because the card systems prohibit retailers from passing on the 
acceptance fee only to credit card users.128 A merchant, therefore, 
cannot choose to surcharge higher priced credit cards, while 
blending the cost of non-reward cards into its prices. As an initial 
matter, it is far from obvious why a wealth transfer resulting 
from choices made jointly by card systems and merchants, who 
choose to accept the cards, should justify regulatory intervention 
when a transfer resulting solely from the merchant’s choice does 
not. Moreover, any difference based on the entity responsible for 
the choice is overstated and, to the extent that it is valid, the 
limits that card systems impose are justified by the unusual 
economics governing credit card markets. 
It is overstated, because although, the card systems 
prohibit surcharging, they permit merchants to allocate extra 
costs to credit card customers in other ways. Federal law 
safeguards cash discounting,129 and many stores offer discounts 
for consumers who use that store’s own credit card.130 Stores 
might also offer separate, and fewer, check-out lines for credit 
card customers or free delivery for those who pay in cash. To be 
sure, these measures may be less effective and/or more costly than 
surcharging credit card purchases would be. Nevertheless, 
retailers have options that would enable them to place at least a 
portion of their card acceptance costs on credit card users if doing 
so would increase their profits. Most retailers, however, simply 
choose not to use these available tools. 
More importantly, to the extent that the credit card 
                                                          
 128  Katz, supra note 39, at 47; Frankel & Shampine, supra note 38, at 636. 
 129  15 U.S.C. § 1666f  (2011). 
 130  Appendix at II.G. See BEST BUY, supra note 98. 
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systems do limit the ability to pass costs on to card users, they 
have a legitimate business justification for doing so. A card 
system must provide a service to two distinct customer bases, 
consumers and merchants.131 In such a two-sided market, 
efficient pricing generally requires fee setting that diverges from 
marginal cost pricing for each customer set.132 Just as a 
newspaper charges advertisers above marginal cost prices so that 
it can deliver papers to readers at a price below marginal cost, 
card systems charge merchants higher fees to enable the system to 
attract cardholders and stimulate card use. If merchants fully 
allocated the cost of card acceptance to individual card users, the 
card systems could become less efficient. These pricing 
considerations, which are addressed more fully in the following 
Part, make credit card acceptance fees different from most other 
merchant expenditures in a way that justifies a prohibition on 
surcharging.133 
2.  Credit Card Fees Would Be Easier to Allocate than Other 
Amenities 
Allocating some merchant-provided amenities to 
particular customers would be costly. For example, a merchant 
charging for parking might need to limit access to the lot and hire 
an attendant. Allocating credit card costs to those customers who 
                                                          
 131  In the Visa and MasterCard systems, the central system generally deals 
only with banks issuing cards and signing merchants. In some instances, these 
systems may deal with large merchants, but never with cardholders. Economic 
analysis of card systems, however, has typically viewed the participating 
banks as part of the overall system marking cards accessible to both consumers 
and merchants. 
 132  Richard Schmalensee, Payment Systems and Interchange Fees, 50 J. OF 
INDUS. ECON. 103, 114 (2002) (“Unless the partial demand functions are 
identical, using cost-based regulation to determine [the per transaction 
interchange fee] will maximize system output only by chance.”); Guerin-
Calvert & Ordover, supra note 86, at 384-85 (explaining that “[t]he network 
externalities that link merchants who accept cards and card-holders who use 
them compel a price/fee structure that will likely entail deviations from the 
cost-causality principles that call for prices to be closely linked to the 
underlying costs of providing direct benefits to either side of the market”); 
Michael L. Katz, What Do We Know About Interchange Fees and What Does 
it Mean for Public Policy?: Commentary on Evans and Schmalensee, 126 
(Proceedings – Payment Systems Research Conferences, Fed. Reserve Bank of 
Kansas City, 2005) available at 
http://www.kansascityfed.org/PUBLICAT/PSR/pscp/2005/katz.pdf. 
 133  See infra Part VII.B & C. 
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use them would, by contrast, entail a relatively small incremental 
cost after the initial investment.134 Merchants, however, rarely 
allocate the cost of amenities even where they could do so easily 
(e.g., shopping carts or bags). Customer resistance to extra 
charges, rather than administrative expense, likely explains the 
failure to allocate to particular customers both the cost of 
amenities and credit card acceptance fees. 
3.  Consumers Can Choose Whether to Use Most Amenities 
One commentator has argued that credit card fees are 
different from other merchant expenses because consumers can 
choose whether to use virtually all merchant-provided amenities, 
but those without a credit card cannot choose to use one. Nor can 
the card-less avoid the wealth transfer by shopping elsewhere 
because almost all retail outlets accept credit cards.135 
In many, perhaps most, cases, however, a consumer who 
does not use a credit card could use one. Although the terms will 
surely vary based on a cardholder’s credit risk, very few 
consumers cannot obtain a credit card if they want one.136 Most 
consumers who do not use credit cards for particular transactions 
choose not to use them for a host of reasons, including 
philosophical objections, budget planning, avoiding interest, 
masking a record of the purchase, and whim. In these cases, 
credit card acceptance is no different from other merchant-
provided amenities. 
Some consumers, however, may have their choices limited 
as a practical matter even if they could theoretically obtain a 
credit card. A significant percentage of American consumers have 
no banking relationship, and the poorest Americans and minority 
groups comprise a large majority of this unbanked population.137 
For this group, a welfare transfer, if it exists, would be unfair, but 
not unusual. As described above, low-income consumers suffer in 
a host of ways vis-à-vis those with higher incomes, and non-card 
users could help themselves more readily than those 
disadvantaged by other merchant practices. Low-wealth fliers 
                                                          
 134  Katz, supra note 39, at 47. 
 135  Levitin, supra note 52, at 34-35. 
 136   Id. at 14. 
 137   Id. at 36.  Javier Silva & Rebecca Epstein, Costly Credit, DEMOS, (May 
2005), (using data from 1992-2001 and showing that 82% of whites held credit 
cards, but only 59% of blacks and 53% of Latinos) available at 
http://www.aecf.org/. 
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could not readily increase their use of air transportation 
sufficiently to qualify for free flights through frequent flier 
programs. And parking, the quintessential merchant-provided 
amenity that is often blended into purchase prices, can only be 
enjoyed by those with cars. The carless, like the card-less, come 
disproportionately from low-income households, and obtaining 
and maintaining a car is considerably more difficult than 
obtaining and using a credit card. 
VII.  INAPPROPRIATE RESPONSES TO WEALTH 
TRANSFER 
In addition to the concerns recognized above, the FRBB 
authors’ proposed regulatory remedies would be at least as likely 
to increase consumer harm as to alleviate it. Although an 
omniscient social planner could set credit card merchant fees at 
precisely the right level to maximize consumer welfare, the FRBB 
authors recognize that, like leprechauns, planners with perfect 
market knowledge are hard to find. They thus point out that if 
regulators set merchant fees at the wrong level, they would do 
more harm than good.138 
In an attempt to avoid this problem, the authors draw on 
the standard presumption that “cost-based pricing”139 is 
preferable. The FRBB authors refer to cost when suggesting that 
merchants could be empowered to surcharge credit card 
purchases. An objective cost measure, however, could also, in 
theory, reduce regulatory discretion while indirectly decreasing 
the price that merchants pay for card acceptance. Because of the 
two-sided nature of credit card markets, however, the FRBB 
authors’ proposed responses could reduce consumer welfare by 
distorting efficient card system pricing. 
A.   Efficient Pricing in Credit Card Markets 
In real world markets, pricing decisions are based on a 
variety of factors including cost, value, and the impact of 
competition.  Standard economic theory generally presumes that 
cost-based pricing is desirable. In two-sided markets, like credit 
cards, however, one must focus on the entire system’s costs and 
the relative elasticity of demand of the customers on each side of 
                                                          
 138  FRBB, supra note 1, at 36. 
 139  Id. at 35. 
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the market, rather than the costs of serving a particular customer. 
In setting prices, card systems face two distinct customer 
bases: cardholders and merchants. Within such a two-sided 
market, prices are efficiently set at the level necessary to recover 
the system’s marginal costs. But the efficient price for the 
cardholder and the merchant, the two sides of the market, may 
not equal the marginal cost of the services received by each of 
them. On the contrary, two-sided market theory predicts that an 
efficient system will charge prices returning more than the 
marginal cost of service to the customer set that is less sensitive to 
price, i.e. has lower demand elasticity, and prices below marginal 
cost to the customers on the other side. Assuming that merchant 
demand for card acceptance is less elastic than cardholder 
demand, allowing card systems to set merchant fees above their 
basic costs of providing acceptance services, and prohibiting 
surcharges, may enable the systems to ensure an efficient pricing 
structure in which merchants pay more than their marginal cost 
of service and cardholders pay less. By contrast, empowering 
merchants to place card acceptance costs on card users, or 
capping through regulation credit card acceptance fees at some 
measure of cost created by merchants, would be inefficient to the 
extent that it failed to take proper account of the relative 
elasticities of demand between card users and merchants with 
respect to card use. 
1.  Understanding Two-sided Markets 
In a two-sided market (as all payment system markets 
are), the use of the product or service by consumers on each side 
of the market makes the product or service more valuable to 
those on the other. Common examples of markets functioning this 
way include newspapers (readers and advertisers), dating services 
(men and women), and optical disc technology suppliers (disc 
pressers and player manufacturers). The more readers, men, and 
disc pressers that use these products and services, the more 
valuable they will be to advertisers, women, and player 
manufacturers; and vice versa.140 
Although the connection between value and use across 
                                                          
 140  For a detailed discussion of the economics of two-sided markets see 
generally David S. Evans & Michael Noel, Defining Antitrust Markets When 
Firms Operate Two-Sided Platforms, 2005 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 667; David S. 
Evans, The Antitrust Economics of Multi-Sided Platform Markets, 20 YALE J. 
ON REG. 325 (2003). 
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customer types in a two-sided network market is intuitively 
obvious, the implication of this economic effect for efficient 
pricing is more opaque. In a typical one-sided market, an efficient 
price – one that will lead to an optimal consumption level – will 
generally approximate the marginal cost of production plus the 
profit necessary to attract investment to the industry.141 This 
pricing model is efficient because it maximizes short-run output 
consistently with the producer earning sufficient revenue to 
continue providing the product or service. 
In a two-sided market, the same principle applies, but 
efficient pricing must take account of both total cost and the 
relative elasticities of demand between the two customer sets.142 If 
the customers on each side of such a market (merchants and 
cardholders in rewards credit card markets) were charged the 
marginal cost of serving just their side of the market, they could 
fail to internalize the impact of their decisions to the customer set 
on the other side.143 For example, a merchant would fail to 
account for the benefits of reward card use to a customer who 
would make the same purchase with or without a card. 
Two-sided market economic theory predicts that if 
demand elasticities diverge to any significant degree between the 
customers on each side of the market, output under a pricing 
scheme that covered marginal-cost separately on each side of the 
market would be inefficiently low. To obtain an efficient output 
level, a producer must charge the customer set that is more 
sensitive to price less than marginal cost of serving that customer 
(effectively enabling those consumers to internalize the benefits to 
both sides of the market).144 
The classic example is the daily newspaper.145 Readers 
have many sources of news, including television, magazines, and 
the internet. Reader demand for newspapers is thus likely to be 
                                                          
 141  Katz, supra note 132, at 127. 
 142  Evans & Noel, supra note 140, at 681. 
 143  Katz, supra note 39, at 126-27; Wright, supra note 76, at 8; Guerin-
Calvert & Ordover, supra note 86, at 384-85 (explaining that “[t]he network 
externalities that link merchants who accept cards and card-holders who use 
them compel a price/fee structure that will likely entail deviations from the 
cost-causality principles that call for prices to be closely linked to the 
underlying costs of providing direct benefits to either side of the market”). 
 144  Katz, supra note 39, at 127; Rochet & Tirole, supra note 39, at 566; 
Wright, supra note 76, at 17. 
 145  See Benjamin Klein et al., Competition in Two-sided Markets: The 
Antitrust Economics of Payment Card Interchange, 73 ANTITRUST L. J. 571, 
577-79 (2006). 
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quite elastic, leading them to turn away from the morning paper 
if the subscription price were to approach the marginal cost of 
producing and delivering it. By contrast, advertisers perceive 
significant benefits in print advertising (so long as readership is 
high), and are thus willing to pay substantially above the 
newspapers’ marginal cost of printing and providing associated 
services to the advertiser because of the value of exposure 
through a high circulation paper. As a result, readers pay 
significantly below marginal cost and advertisers pay 
substantially more.146 Competition between newspapers and 
other media for advertising space still drives pricing, but not to 
marginal cost plus normal profit for each customer set. 
This pricing pattern efficiently optimizes newspaper 
circulation, satisfying both the advertisers’ need for broad 
exposure and the readers’ need for information. Assuming that 
newspapers have little market power, both advertisers and 
readers would be worse off if pricing were forced into line with 
marginal cost on each side of the market. If advertising fees were 
to drop and reader fees proportionally increased, prices would 
move toward marginal cost on each side of the market. Because 
reader demand is more elastic, however, readership would drop 
more than advertising would increase, and advertising rates 
would thus fall. As a result, the paper would (1) earn lower 
overall revenue; (2) be less valuable to advertisers because 
readership would fall; and (3) be less valuable to readers because 
the paper would have less revenue for newsgathering. 
2.  Applying Two-sided Market Theory to Card Markets 
To the extent that the elasticity of demand varies 
significantly between merchants and cardholders, credit systems 
resemble newspapers. Assuming that merchants, like print 
advertisers, are willing to pay significantly above the marginal 
cost of the credit card acceptance services provided directly to 
merchants because of the value card acceptance creates, but 
many cardholders, like newspaper readers, would be reluctant to 
pay the marginal cost of providing credit cards and associated 
services,147 two-sided market theory predicts that efficient credit 
card pricing would resemble the existing marketplace – a greater 
share of the total costs of the payment system are placed on 
                                                          
 146  Id. at 577. 
 147  Id. at 585-88. 
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merchants.148 
To be sure, relative elasticities across customer groups are 
difficult to measure. Long standing practice in credit card 
markets, however, appears to confirm that cardholder demand is 
considerably more elastic than merchant demand.149 Since the 
beginning, card systems have adopted cost allocation systems that 
empower cardholders to use cards without taking account of costs 
that arise as a result of their decision.  Every existing credit card 
system has done this by charging merchants more than the cost of 
providing card acceptance services, and each system adopted that 
pricing policy well before it had market power.150 By uniformly 
adopting a pricing policy in a competitive market that shifts 
revenue from the merchant side to the cardholder side, the card 
systems practice accords with what two-sided market theory 
would predict.151 
The efficiency of this form of elasticity-based pricing 
garners further support by the growth in both merchant 
acceptance and card use over time.152 If a pricing policy placing a 
greater burden on the merchant side were inefficient, one would 
expect to see merchants rejecting credit cards. But that has not 
happened. The existing system of cost allocation appears to be 
efficient, and forcing cardholders to cover costs now paid by 
merchants would be likely to lead to an inefficient under-use of 
cards. 
                                                          
 148  Id. at 584; Schmalensee, supra note 132, at 115 (explaining that 
“increasing total output . . . by subsidizing price cuts where demand elasticity 
is high . . . increases the size of the pie for the system as a whole”). 
 149  In ATM and PIN debit card markets, by contrast, interchange fees 
have in some cases flowed away from issuers and toward merchants. 
 150  Semeraro, supra note 19, at 988 (explaining that “[t]he direction of 
interchange fee payments . . . appears to be consistent with an efficient and 
competitive market”); see Katz, supra note 39, at 123 (virtually all debit card 
systems also have interchange fees flowing from merchants to issuers). 
 151  See Steven Semeraro, The Efficiency and Fairness of Enforced 
Sharing: An Examination of the Essence of Antitrust, 52 U. KAN. L. REV. 57, 
97-98 (2003) (discussing generally how practices undertaken by firms in 
competitive markets are presumptively efficient). 
 152  Judge Frank H. Easterbrook has famously explained that practices 
increasing output over time are likely to be efficient. See Frank H. 
Easterbrook, On Identifying Exclusionary Conduct, 61 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
972, 979 (1986); Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. 
REV. 1, 30-34 (1984). 
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B. Efficient Pricing With Realistic Market Assumptions 
Even if card acceptance fees were inefficiently high, 
reducing those fees through regulation or shifting those fees to 
cardholders could make the situation worse. The FRBB authors 
do not even claim to show that fees are at inefficient levels, and 
their analysis does not provide any means of determining the 
overall impact on consumer welfare. 
Two-sided market economic theory, however, predicts 
that shifting costs from one side of the market to the other – as 
regulation or surcharging would – would leave the market less 
efficient if demand elasticities differ between the two markets. If 
card markets are reasonably competitive and thus presumptively 
efficient, any regulatory intervention is likely to do more harm 
than good.153 
To understand the anticompetitive effect, consider a chess 
club that when charging a uniform dues level for all players has a 
membership that is (1) disproportionately low-skill players and (2) 
lower in number than the club could efficiently accommodate. 
The club organizers therefore decide to offer free admission to 
high-skilled players, while increasing the dues charged to low-
skilled members of the club. This differential pricing (1) attracts 
more high-skilled players, (2) makes the club more desirable for 
low-skilled players who thus attend more often, and (3) increases 
membership and utilization of club facilities. By attracting more 
high-skilled players through differential pricing, the club 
functions more efficiently and thus all of its members benefit. To 
be sure, low-skilled players bear a greater percentage of the cost 
of operating the club than high-skilled players. But the club 
provides more value to them, i.e. the chance to play against and 
                                                          
 153  Katz, supra note 39, at 17 (explaining that surcharging can undo the 
effects of interchange fees). Alan Frankel has questioned this justification for 
the no-surcharge rule, arguing that if merchants want to encourage additional 
card use, they could easily do so themselves through point-of-sale discounts 
and other incentives. Frankel & Shampine, supra note 38, at 647. But 
merchants face conflicting incentives. The benefits that they receive from 
credit cards are often infra-marginal, such as an overall increase in spending 
levels not directly tied to individual transaction purchase decisions. Merchants 
benefit at the margin only when the cardholder would not make the purchase 
without the card. If the customer would make the purchase in all events, a 
merchant may experience a marginal benefit from the use of another means of 
payment, but an infra-marginal loss if cardholders stopped carrying credit 
cards altogether. See Adam Levitin, Priceless? The Competitive Costs of Credit 
Card Merchant Restraints, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1321, 1348-49, 1353 (2008). 
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learn from higher-skilled players. 
The chess club with differential pricing corresponds to the 
existing credit card market in which merchants, like low-skilled 
players in the example, pay a higher percentage of the costs of the 
payment system than necessary to recover the marginal cost of 
serving them. Using the FRBB authors’ terminology, the chess 
club’s pricing policy would transfer wealth from low-skilled 
players to high-skilled players. But by choosing to frequent the 
club in greater numbers, the low-skilled players demonstrated 
that they preferred the club with differential pricing to the less 
expensive club with a single price. Merchants’ willingness to 
accept credit cards in ever increasing numbers within the card 
systems’ existing pricing models communicates the same message. 
Regulation or surcharging in the card market would 
disrupt this presumptively efficient pricing mechanism by 
shifting some costs onto cardholders. A similar disruption might 
occur in the chess club if the meeting organizers surcharged high-
skilled players by, for example, charging them more for 
refreshments at club meetings, undoing the benefit of the 
differential pricing. High-skilled players enticed to join the club 
by no dues policy would soon realize that they were paying more 
for refreshments. The meeting organizer, like a merchant 
surcharging card transactions, negates the benefit of the no dues 
policy. High-skilled players would quit and the club would thus 
end up back where it started – with an inefficiently low number 
of members all paying the same entry fee. 
The competitively set merchant fees, combined with a no-
surcharge rule preventing merchants from undermining the 
efficiency-enhancing purpose of the card systems’ differential 
pricing policies, is a presumptively efficient pricing mechanism. 
Just as high-skilled chess players would quit the club if short-
sighted meeting organizers surcharged their refreshments, 
cardholders would reduce their use of cards if regulators forced 
banks to increase fees to cardholders or if merchants passed on 
acceptance fees through surcharging. And if card acceptance 
costs ever did reach inefficiently high levels, merchants would 
have options. They could stop accepting credit cards or particular 
brands of cards; they could offer cash discounts; and they could 
offer their own reward programs to entice consumers to use the 
merchant’s preferred means of payment. 
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C. Additional Concerns with Surcharging 
Even putting aside the likelihood that regulation or 
surcharging would undermine efficient differential card-system 
pricing, surcharging would be unlikely to increase consumer 
welfare. First, a surcharging scheme would impose substantial 
costs on a merchant that may outweigh any card-acceptance fee 
reduction. Programming systems and training employees to 
implement such a scheme would be a costly endeavor with 
uncertain potential returns.  These costs would be borne by all of 
the merchant’s customers. 
Second, even if surcharging were costless and could be 
implemented without stoking customer dissatisfaction, merchants 
would be unlikely to use the tactic efficiently. If there were an 
inefficient overcharge by the card system, a surcharge could 
theoretically improve efficiency. But it would be virtually 
impossible for a merchant to know how much of a surcharge 
would be necessary to counteract the overcharge. Because 
efficient pricing in two-sided markets reflects the relative 
elasticities between the two customer bases – not the marginal 
cost of providing service to the merchant – the merchant would 
not have the information necessary to determine how much of the 
card acceptance fee to shift to cardholders without undoing the 
pro-competitive benefits of differential pricing. 
Moreover, even if merchants could calculate the optimal 
surcharge, they would likely charge more because they would not 
internalize all of the cardholder’s benefits of using a credit card. 
If credit cards cost more on a per transaction basis than other 
means of payment, then a merchant would prefer that its 
customers use credit cards only when they would not otherwise 
make the purchase with a cheaper payment device.154 In setting 
the surcharge, then, a merchant would discount the value of card 
use to the infra-marginal consumer who would make the 
purchase with or without a card, but would legitimately prefer to 
use the card. Legitimate reasons to use a card include the desire 
not to carry cash and to retain sufficient funds on ones person or 
in a checking account for emergencies for which a credit card 
would not be an acceptable means of payment. 
Ultimately, merchants would likely divide into roughly 
                                                          
 154  Wright, supra note 76, at 8-9; see Katz, supra note 39, at 55 
(“surcharges might fail to be set at efficient levels even if acquiring and issuing 
were perfectly competitive”). 
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two camps: The first group, merchants in reasonably competitive 
markets, would likely find the costs of surcharging prohibitive.155 
The second group, merchants with substantial market power, 
might surcharge, but these merchants could potentially retain a 
significant portion of the card fee savings as profit rather than 
pass it on to their customers.156 These merchants may even use 
the surcharging power to exact greater profits from those 
consumers who must use a credit card for a particular 
transaction.157 
A merchant with market power could thus do 
considerable competitive damage, and there is reason to believe 
that at least some merchants would exploit the opportunity.  The 
possibility that most merchants would have the ability and 
incentive to wield a surcharging scalpel precise enough to cut out 
the bad, while preserving the good, is remote. 
VIII. APPROPRIATE RESPONSES TO NEGATIVE 
CONSUMER WELFARE EFFECTS FROM REWARD 
CREDIT CARD USE 
The FRBB authors recognize that their proposals would 
reduce the welfare of consumers currently collecting credit card 
rewards. But they believe that this loss would be outweighed by 
the gains of other consumers. Their analysis, however, does not 
confirm that their proposals would, on balance, help consumers. 
As this paper has shown, the predicted wealth transfer may not 
exist at all. If that is true, then credit card rewards serve a 
                                                          
 155  See Zhu Wang, Market Structure and Credit Card Pricing: What 
Drives Interchange?, 28 INT’L J. OF INDUS. ORG. 86, 95 (2010) (concluding that 
the no-surcharge rule “does not play a role” with respect to merchants in 
competitive markets). 
 156  Julian Wright, Optimal Card Payment Systems 8 (Social Science 
Research Network, National University of Singapore, Working Paper, 2002) 
available at  http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=278047 
(explaining that “[w]hen surcharging is allowed, merchants with monopoly 
power will exploit their power by setting a price to extract surplus from 
inframarginal cardholders”). 
 157  See Gans & King; supra note 102, at 25 (explaining that the no 
surcharge rule “can play an important, socially desirable, role in eliminating 
the ability of merchants to use the choice of payment instrument as a means of 
practicing price discrimination . . . [that] serves to distort the cost of 
transacting further away from its cost minimizing level”); Wang, supra note 
155, explaining that no-surcharge rule can be welfare enhancing where it limits 
surcharging by merchants with market power); Wright, supra note 156, at 8. 
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valuable function in stimulating card use that effectively benefits 
all consumers. Encouraging merchants to surcharge could undo 
that benefit.  Second, even if there is a wealth transfer, capping 
fees, as the FRBB authors admit, may itself undermine consumer 
welfare goals. And permitting surcharging may have little impact 
and could cause problems of its own. Merchants in competitive 
industries may avoid surcharging, just as they have refused to 
implement cash discounting schemes, because of the costs and 
likely customer backlash. Merchants with market power, by 
contrast, would likely surcharge. But these merchants may push 
the surcharge beyond the level of any cross-subsidy and retain the 
excess as profit rather than lowering their prices. Low income 
and unbanked individuals might be worse off in such a regime. 
If regulatory intervention is deemed necessary, a more 
fruitful approach would be to foster banking relationships among 
those who currently do not have them.  This strategy would have 
two prongs.  First, informational programs could educate the 
unbanked about the availability and safety of banking services, 
including credit cards.  Second, regulators could provide 
incentives to financial institutions to reach out to the currently 
unbanked. 
Those who are currently outside the system may benefit 
far more from banking services, including credit cards of their 
own, than from potentially efficiency-defeating regulation 
designed to eliminate a cross subsidy that may not exist. Credit 
cards have very low or even negative costs to cardholders who do 
not run balances. The means of payment used today by those 
with no banking relationship, principally cash and money orders, 
impose significant costs that extend well beyond cross subsidies. 
The risk of uninsured loss through theft or otherwise is 
significant. In addition, while many checking accounts now 
impose no or minimal fees for depositing or writing a check, 
check cashing outlets, and those that sell money orders, impose 
substantial fees. And, of course, using these services is time 
consuming. Lastly, when the need to purchase on credit arises, an 
unbanked consumer is generally limited to expensive “payday” 
loans; the rigors of the pawn shop; or worse. Access to a credit 
card for unbanked individuals could reduce or eliminate these 
costs as well as any cross-subsidy. 
CONCLUSION 
It is quite difficult to make the case that regulatory 
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intervention could right a social wrong inflicted on those who do 
not use credit cards. One cannot conclusively demonstrate that 
card use reduces consumer welfare, and even if it did, the 
potential cures would likely be worse than the disease. That 
regulators have not intervened in the many markets that display 
potential wealth transfer effects supports this view. And given 
the economics of two-sided markets governing payment system 
pricing, capping merchant fees or permitting surcharging would 
likely lead to inefficiencies that increase prices and decrease 
welfare. By contrast, legislation designed to extend the benefits of 
credit cards to those households not currently using them 
regularly would likely provide more certain and valuable 
benefits. 
 
